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Abstract
Historical studies of U.S. capital markets show a dramatic skew in the distribution of
corporate wealth. This thesis investigates the evolution of economic thought related to realistic
models of competition, seeking to f ind the most suitable theory of comp etition to explain this skew
in U.S. corporate wealth creation. The incorporation of realistic elements into the static theories of
competition leads to theoretical dif ficulties in the early 20th century. Another line of thought
developed non-equilibrium dynamic models of competition, culminating in Schumpeter. In
Schumpeter, f irms seek to manage the uncertainty f rom rapid change induced by innovation and
increasing returns by f ollowing regulative business strategies to reduce the uncertainty of
investment. Failure to manage the uncertainty of investment results in “creative destruction,”
allowing f irms with superior strategies to reap disproporation rewards, resulting in a skewed
distribution of corporate wealth, until the environment changes to undermine t he previously
successf ul strategy.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Motivating Questions
Our interest in this paper is to examine economic theories of competition which can best
meet realistic theoretical conditions and economic history. In particular, we are searching f or
theories of competition which can encounter and describe the signif icant skew in the distribution
of U.S. public corporate wealth creation since 1926 (“wealth creation”). Wealth creation is def ined
as the increase in the aggregate value of a f irm’s common stock in excess of that which would
have otherwise been obtained by investing in risk f ree securities.
The skew in the distribution implies the persistent presence of f irms which capture and
maintain signif icant market share—implying signif icant prof it potential—yet whose continued
existence and dominance is not assured. Many of these f irms, af ter all, dominate records of
corporate wealth creation f or decades only to go out of business. In other words, the f inancial
record in the United States strongly suggests that the most realistic theory of competition will be
one of monopolistic competition with super normal prof its which are, nevertheless, uncertain in
the long run.
In this paper, we will f irst go over the most realistic theories of competition f rom
marginalist economics looking specifically at Alf red Marshall, Piero Sraf f a and Edward
Chamberlin. We will then review the dynamic theory of competitive behavior in Joseph
Schumpeter, Frank Knight and Maurice Dobb. Our conclusion is that Schumpeter’s approach to
the theory of competition is more developed and specif ic than is commonly recognized. It is
established on a well developed theoretical f oundation within the prior literature and builds of f an
inf requently discussed branch of competition theory running f rom a young Schumpeter to Knight
and Dobb bef ore coming back to Schumpeter. The well known concept of “creative destruction” is
1

rarely put into its proper context of justif ication f or Schumpeter’s theory of monopolistic
competition which, to some observers of the 1940s, seemed to amount to a def ense of
monopolistic corporate practices.
It is appropriate to view Schumpeter’s theory as superseding and incorporating the
advances in dynamic theory made by Frank Knight and Maurice Dobb. Allyn Young’s f amous
1928 paper on increasing returns is discussed as it ref lects an early stage sketch of a dynamic
theory of competition, while providing a more technical discussion of the pervasive increasing
returns environment. These increasing returns are themselves responsible f or creating the rapidly
changing environment, which creates the f undamentally uncertain environment that needs to be
managed by f irms in their competitive process. Thus, while Young’s contributions in this direction
were cut short by this untimely death in 1929, his rigorous analysis of the importance of
increasing returns helps to explain theoretically the creatively destructive environment which f irms
f ind themselves in: increasing returns create rapid economic change which cut away the basis f or
generalizations, resulting in new avenues f or innovative investment, resulting in f undamental
uncertainty, resulting in the requirement that f irms plan to manage this uncertainty. Management
of this uncertainty, in Schumpeter, means f irms take competitive actions that they believe are the
most likely to help them control and inf luence their proximate economic environment.
If “creative destruction” is one half of Schumpeter’s theory, the other half is his theory of
“regulative strategies” to manage this uncertainty of f uture prof its. Firms f ollow competitive
policies—set prices, make adjustments to products, f ollow certain sales strategies, f ollow certain
investment processes, among other things—on the basis of a general plan, a “regulative
strategy,” developed to manage the long term uncertainty of their investment which arises f rom
operating in a rapidly changing economic environment.
Some specif ic techniques of managing uncertainty will be discussed when we review
Frank Knight’s work where he ref ers to common techniques used to manage uncertainty. Firms,
in their quest f or prof its, invest with a desire f or returns yet the specif ic policy of investment is, in
Schumpeter, made on the dual basis of whether it helps to protect past investment f rom new
2

competition, in addition to the desire of generating new streams of prof it. Firms in this model will
seek to expand continuously so as to diversif y and f ind new avenues f or growth —growth
becomes the health of the enterprise in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Instead of simply
looking at the raw mathematics of M-C-M’ driving accumulation, it is the threat of f uture
destruction and the goal of protecting existing profit streams which drive f urther accumulation
through investment.
These approaches can be contrasted with marginalist economics where economists
approached realistic theories by attempting to take into account widely observed phenomena,
such as increasing returns to scale in manuf acturing and oligopic market structures. As we will
discuss in our review of static marginalist economics, incorporating these phenomena into static
models lead to f urther dif f iculties and, ultimately, a chain of events which resulted in the decline in
Marshallian economics. It was in the shadow of these events that leading economists, like Knight
and Schumpeter, began to suggest a strong distinction between st atic and dynamic theories of
economic analysis.
The historical results f rom US capital markets broaden the f ocus of the theory of
competition away f rom only looking at the median or typical corporate f irm, which we will see
produces meagre f inancial returns, to the median or typical increase in corporate wealth, the
latter of which will be concentrated in a small number of super f irms. A theory of competition can
only be adequate if it is able to deal with the median f irm as well as the super f irm, especially
since the median increase in corporate wealth is f ound within the super f irms. It is these super
f irms which, f requently holding signif icant market share, determine average f inancial returns and
determine other average relationships throughout their industry and the economy more broadly.
Many theories, particularly static theories, are designed explicitly to only deal with the average
f irm and, by def inition, exclude these super f irms f rom the analysis.
Instead of competing on price, even understood in its most abstract way, competition in
the dynamic theories proceeds on a much more complex basis, taking into account realistic
institutional arrangements. Schumpeter is said to have viewed the book in which this theory is
3

presented, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, as allowing f or economic theory in the context
of institutional change. In this sense, competition through “regulative strategies” can be seen as
working to reduce the long term uncertainty of investment within its realistic institutionalis t
context.
In the initial reviews of Schumpeter’s dynamic theory, some f elt his theory of “regulative
strategies” was an inappropriate def ense of monopolistic behavior, while hailing the language of
“creative destruction,” a term borrowed f rom Werner Sombart. This general reaction has carried
through to the present where his theory of monopolistic competition is inf requently taught and
hardly examined in detail and theoretical origin.
As we will show, creative destruction and regulative strategies are c omplimentary. It is
the uncertainty f rom rapid economic change which can cause “creative destruction,” which results
in f irm’s f ollowing “regulative strategies” to manage the uncertainty f rom change. From this point
of view, Schumpeter is attempting to put f orward a dynamic theory of competition which can
serve economics in its traditional role of regulating qualities and quantities within the economic
system, all within the context of pervasive “monopolistic competition.”
While there is some evidence that Schumpeter is not entirely satisf ied with his solution to
the problem of realistic competition, this theory of corporate f irms pursuing strategy to manage
uncertainty f rom rapid economic change represents the best theory he could come up within his
lif etime. Unlike a theory which presumes all competition to proceed on the basis of price—or, in
its more developed f orm under Chamberlin, where it proceeds on the basis of price, advertising
expense and product variation—this theory is inclusive of all f orms of competitive behavior
overtime within a realistic and complex institutional context. It is not necessarily an abstract
theory of a single product f irm in a single market but rather a theory of the behavior of a unit of
capital seeking to survive and grow. In that sense, it is properly seen as a theory of the process of
competition with the successf ul result being prof its.

4

1.2 Competition in Economic Theory
Competition in economic theory plays the critical role of regulating qualities and
quantities, notably price and output in static economics, and is the actuating f orce behind the
distribution of resources and the division of labor. The economic literature over the last 150 years
makes important, but wholly theoretical, distinctions between “perf ect competition,” “pure
competition,” “imperf ect competition,” and “monopolistic competition,” contrasting these with
“absolute monopoly” where competition offers no f orces to regulate prof its or output. These
concepts have meaning largely as a means of describing different market structures at
equilibrium within the context of static marginalist equilibrium economics. For the purposes of this
essay, we take it f or granted that there is a clear distinction between static economics and —
employing any of the wide number of terms used by Schumpeter and Knight —“dynamic,”
“development,” “historical,” or “evolutionary” economics. The latter theories can be said to deal
with actual outcomes in historical time, the f ormer only with theoretical outcomes with f ixed sets
of f actors.
According to McNulty, the analytic f unction of competition in economic analysis was
already well developed by the time Adam Smith turned to the question in The Wealth of Nations.
McNulty cites the use of the theory of competition in Boisguillebert, Cantillon, Turgot, James
Steuart and Adam Smith’s colleague David Hume. 1 Competitions “analytical f unction was its
recognized tendency to bring the market price to a level which would eliminate both excessive
prof its and unsatisf ied demand, that is, to the lowest level sustainable over the long run.”2 Smith’s
competitive process was a dynamic rivalrous process f or profits with capital f lowing into new
markets with high prof its and out of markets with low prof its, all with prof its being directionally
related to “risk” without being proportionate. Ricardo limits his analysis to markets where
competition operates without “restraint.” We will see that our modern environment of f ers many

1

Paul J. Mcnulty, “A Note on the History of Perfect Competition,” Journal of Political Economy 75, no. 4, Part 1 (1967): pp.
395-399, https://doi.org/10.1086/259295, p. 395-396.
2

Ibid.
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competitive restraints, although ones f ar dif f erent f rom the legal restraint s of the early 19th
century. Mill f amously states, just bef ore discussing problems which result in f rictions impeding
the operations of competition, that “only through the principle of competition has political economy
any pretension to the character of a science." 3
The conceptual construction of perf ect competition was well advanced bef ore the turn of
the 20th century. Yet by the end of the 19th century, a corporate merger movement had
dramatically altered the industrial landscape and global world wide trade was at a high point
under the gold standard managed by the Bank of England. Domestic markets in the United States
and Europe were stitched together by train and telegraph. International markets were stitched
together by steam ships and undersea telegraph cables. The creation of national markets opened
the way to economies of scale and new business strategies embodied in size. The era of big
business, which began with the railroads, was in f ull swing. The environment looked increasingly
dif f erent f rom which was embodied in the mathematical economics of Walras, although the
competitive theory within the American and British economic prof ession was not yet, as it would
become, “rigorously” def ined. Marshall’s popular textbook repeatedly notes that the problems of
partial equilibrium analysis and the problems of taking supply and demand analysis too f ar. High
quality data on stock returns to calculate corporate wealth creation only starts in 1926, just as
industrial f irms begin to dominate the US capital markets af ter decades of being built up by
railroad securities. 4
The railroads by themselves had already presented intellectual problems f or competitive
analysis. Allyn Young and Joseph Schumpeter f irst bef riend each other at a conf erence
discussing economic theory and railroad pricing and, characteristically, disagree about regulation.
Edward Chamberlin, who later coined the term “product dif ferentiation” in his ef f ort to describe

3

John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy (Charleston, SC:
BiblioLife, 2009), https://www.gutenberg.org/files/30107/30107-pdf.pdf, p. 176.
4

For a discussion of the composition of US capital markets across this period, see Mary A. O'Sullivan, Dividends of
Development: Securities Markets in the History of US Capitalism, 1866-1922 (Oxford, England: Oxford University press,
2016), p. 345.
6

“monopolistic competition” in static equilibrium, was inspired by the Taussig -Pigou controversy
over railway rates. Chamberlin’s youthf ul conclusion was that:
“[The railroad] cannot secure an increased share in the more prof itable market by of f ering
a lower price, f or his competitors will f ollow at once, and relative shares will be the same
as bef ore. He, theref ore, sets such prices in each market as will make his total return a
maximum, and, in doing so, he will take account of the strength of the demand in each
case, charging "what the traf f ic will bear." If the total returns to each seller are large, there
will be more sellers, rather than a readjustment of their price policies.” 5
This conclusion, authored prior to Sraf f a’s f amous 1926 analysis but resembling it, can be seen
as embodying the elements which are to become the equilibrium app roach to imperf ect market
structures. As will be seen below, in Chamberlin’s f inal equilibrium analysis he assumes away
those very f irms which gives rise to the extraordinary distribution in corporate wealth creation
f ound by Bessembinder. 6 The general thrust of excluding these extreme wealth creators is typical
of the marginalist literature. For instance, Marshall dismisses f irms which are able to obtain
increasing returns to scale over a long period of time because these are “very f ew” f irms. Of
course, it is these very f ew f irm’s which raise the most interesting —and perhaps most important—
questions f or the theory of competition and material economic progress. These f irms, af ter all, by
dominating their respective market sectors have a huge inf luence on p ricing and the direction of
industry.
It is thought that to produce a “general” theory, it must explain the median f irm but, in
doing this, it risks missing what is also important, namely, that the median increment of corporate
wealth is created in an unusually rare f irm. A median publicly traded f irm, according to
Bessembinder’s analysis, provides less return to its equity investors than do monthly government
treasuries. Or, in other words, an investor’s capital will increase f aster by investing in monthl y
government bills than in any randomly chosen public corporate f irm. This historical f act is, as we
will see shortly, at odds with the old generalizations of academic f inance. A “general theory” of
competitive behavior cannot dismiss outliers when these d o not represent the median f irm

5

Edward Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933), p. 295.

6

Hendrik Bessembinder, “Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017,
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2900447.
7

because these same outliers represent the median increment of corporate wealth creation. The
marginal increment of corporate wealth creation, or what can be thought of as the “creation of
capital values,” does not have its source in a “marginal” or “representative” or “median” f irm.
These outlier f irms, through their extraordinary inf luence, are important vectors f or determining
other average relationships throughout the economy. Furthermore, public corporate equities
make up a signif icant portion of total U.S. household and nonprof it f inancial assets, with direct
ownership of equities accounting f or 20.4% of household and nonprof it f inancial assets in the
United States, with signif icant indirect ownership through mutual f unds (10% of U.S. household
and nonprof it f inancial assets) and pension f unds (29.3% of U.S. household and nonprof it
f inancial assets). 7
The top f irm in our extension of Bessembinder accounts f or some 2.6% of all U.S.
corporate wealth creation in the 91 year period 1926 through 2017. This f irm, Apple Inc., has had
a signif icant social and economic impact. In the historical record, however, there have been other
f irms of this nature and there exist a number of f irms of this type—it is not a single instance but a
persistent group of important instances in the history of US capitalism. The f uture will likely bring
about new super wealth creators, which will ref lect their inf luence on the economic relationships
of their time. The challenge f or economic theory is that these examples are excluded f rom static
analysis, as in Chamberlin.
Any theoretical explanation which stops where Chamberlin stops leaves open important
questions. For instance, if a f ew f irms do not respond to competition as might be expected in the
static approach, what ultimately regulates these f irms? Why do they grow, dominate and die?
Take the case of General Motors, f ounded in 1908. By the end of 1970, General Motors was the
greatest wealth creator in the United States—perhaps the world—since the beginning of the
record in 1926. Its lif e, however, ended in bankruptcy and wealth destruction f or investors in
7

Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System. Z1 Financial Accounts of the United States (September 21, 2020),
distributed by the Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20200921/z1.pdf. See Table B.101, p. 138. The remainder of U.S. household
financial assets are in currency, deposits, money market funds, debt securities, life insurance, and equity in noncorporate
businesses, among other items.
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2009. By excluding the extreme f irms f rom static analysis, it also excludes how competition works
on these f irms over time and glosses over their pivotal role in shaping industries.
In what f ollows, we will f irst discuss the f indings of Bessembinder in more detail to
illustrate the nature of the motivating historical observations. We extend his work to look at the
distribution in corporate wealth creation in rolling ten year periods to examine whether the skew in
corporate wealth has changed over time. We will see that in every ten year period there is a small
group of f irm’s which dominate corporate wealth creation in that period or, in other words, there is
a persistent tendency f or wealth creation to be concentrat ed in a small number of super f irms. We
will then bring these f eatures of history into our review of the economic literature on competition.

9

2. Bessembinder and The Skew In Corporate Wealth
Creation
In the theory of capital values put f orward by Irving Fisher in 1907, the value of capital is
its prospective income stream, discounted and adjusted f or the shape of the income f low and the
risks to that stream of income. 8 The capital values measured in Bessembinder are ref lective of
changes in equity prices, which ref lect the f uture as understood by investors in every month since
January 1926. It is our assumption, with Fischer Black, that security prices are ef f icient in that
they are within a “f actor of 2 of value 90% of the time.” 9 Given that, we assume that security
prices can serve as a guide to capital values as created by the competitive process over long
periods of time. We look to corporate wealth creation, instead of accounting prof its, since the
prof it to the capitalist and entrepreneur (who is typically also a “capitalist” in the sense of owning
part of the f irm’s capital) is in part f rom the appreciation of their capital, which can come f rom the
mere expectations of prof its, not necessarily f rom actual prof its themselves. To illustrate this
point, the 5th greatest corporate wealth creator over the 91 year period is Amazon, a f irm which
purposef ully avoided profitability to avoid taxation. By doing so, it was able to retain more capital
f or reinvestment. Such phenomenon can never be captured by looking at returns f rom the
perspective of accounting prof its and can only be seen by looking at capital appreciation in the
capital markets. The notion that capital appreciation needs to be counted as “prof its” was noted
early in the literature by Veblen and Dobb.

8

Irving Fisher, The Rate of Interest: Its Nature, Determination and Relation to Economic Phenomena (Mansfield Center,
CT: Martino Pub., 2009).
9

Fischer Black, “Noise,” The Journal of Finance 41, no. 3 (1986): pp. 528-543, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15406261.1986.tb04513.x, p. 533.
10

Bessembinder is coming f rom the f inance tradition and is investigating the distribution of
f inancial returns over time, scaled according to the number of shares outstanding . Put another
way, he is investigating the relative increase in aggregate equity f inancial capital per f irm
overtime. His paper’s period of investigation begins in 1926 and runs through the end of 2016.
Our own extension repeats this result through 2017 and breaks down the analysis into rolling ten
year periods.
The f inancial prof ession has long been interested in the dif f erences in returns between
stocks and bonds. An early 1924 analysis which Keynes popularized argued that stocks as a
class have greater returns than bonds due to reinvested prof its, resulting in compound interest
ef f ects. 10 The now widespread notion of equities providing greater returns than bonds was
crystallized in a series of papers out of Chicago’s Center f or Research into Securities Prices
(“CRSP”) in the 1960s. By the 1980s, it was canon and f inance academics began to ref er to it as
the “equity premium puzzle.” To these f inance academics, it was not clear why stocks should
perf orm so much better than bonds as a class and the study Keynes had reviewed in the 1920s
was long f orgotten. The source of this conf usion is Modigliani and Miller’s 1958 “capital structure
irrelevance” theory which says that, ignoring bankruptcy, taxes, and growth, equity and debt
instruments should have the same returns or, put another way, should require the same discount
rate to equate their specif ic cash f lows to present value. Thus, the capital structure of f irms should
be “irrelevant” to total enterprise value, inclusive of equity and debt capital. 11
Bessembinder is writing at the end of this long tradition in f inance. The skew i n stock
returns is known and is seen as adding to the arguments f or portf olio diversification. Still, it is
widely considered to be relatively unimportant and, in extreme cases, anomalous. Bessembinder
breaks new ground by investigating this skew and combining it with the aggregate amount of
capital which exists in any period. From this analysis, he shows that there is a huge skew in
10

Edgar Lawrence. Smith, Common Stocks as Long Term Investments (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1935). Reinvestment
is considered the primary effect but it is one of a number of effects the author lists, including management bias in favor of
equity investors and against bond holders.
11

Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,” The
American Economic Review 48, no. 3 (1958): pp. 261-297, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1809766.
11

corporate wealth creation over the 90 year period of 1926 through 2016. Over the lif e of any
publicly traded stock, only 42.1% of them have lif etime returns above those of risk f ree monthly
government treasury bills. 12 This challenges the canon of the “equity premium” and suggests that
any positive premium which exists f or the class is simply due to the f act that the mean of the
skewed distribution is higher than the median.
It is no longer that equities as a class outperf orm bonds but rather a very small portion of
the distribution outperf orm bonds in an extraordinary f ashion. In the history of American
capitalism, the examples of this are numerous. The historical record shows a US cigarette f irm
having compounded returns of 17.6% per annum f or 91 years, a f igure f ar above the bond yields
f or nearly a century. 13 Amazon, which has shown little to no prof its over the period, has returned
38% per annum over 20 years. Bessembinder investigates whether these ef f ects are due to
f inancial leverage and f inds that it plays no role. 14
Bessembinder’s analysis is over a 90 year period and taken in aggregate f inds that 4% of
securities make up all the positive wealth over monthly government treasury bills. The bottom
96% of f irms produce collectively zero net corporate wealth over monthly government treasury
bills. To investigate if the skew in wealth creation persists across smaller periods , we extended
Bessembinder’s analysis to look at rolling ten year periods beginning with the 10 year period
1926 to 1936 and continued every year through the end of 2017. Through our extension of
Bessembinder, we have f ound a relatively stationary distribution of wealth creation over time,
exclusive of periods of financial stress which f lattens and reverses the skew.

12

Hendrik Bessembinder, “Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?,” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2017,
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2900447, p. 1.
13

Bessembinder measures “corporate wealth creation” by looking at monthly price returns in the stocks of US public
corporations and comparing those returns with a “risk free” security, in this case the monthly US treasury bill. Dividends in
any month would count towards excess returns, with taxes being excluded from the analysis. Altria’s extraordinary return
is in part due to a period of paying large dividends throughout the period. Whatever excess return exists would then be
scaled to the number of shares the firm had outstanding. These excess returns generated by corporate equity securities
above the monthly treasury bill, in the period between 1926 and 2017, would then be brought forward to the present using
forward discounting at the risk-free rate and summed. Ibid., p. 17 - 18.
14

Ibid., p. 13.
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2.1 Results of Skew Overtime
In Figure 1, we show the adjusted Fisher Pearson skew f or corporate wealth creation in
each 10 year distribution. This indicates that in most periods there is a positive skew in the
distribution of corporate wealth creation. In other words, in most periods a small number of f irms
account f or a disproportionate share of corporate wealth creation. Dates indicate the end date of
each 10 year period:
Figure 1

The periods of negative skew, such as the period ending in January 2010, ref lect f eatures unique
to this period, notably the f all in asset prices due to the f inancial crisis of 2008. Similar f inancial
ef f ects occur in the periods ending in the middle of the 1970s (the dramatic increase in input
prices, notable oil, resulting in recession) and early 1980s (the uniquely high interest rates which
resulted in lower stock prices). In periods without these peculiar ef f ects, it can be seen that, as a
stylized f act, in most ten year periods there is a strong positive skew in the distribution of
corporate wealth creation.
Bef ore looking at the signif icant concentration of corporate wealth creation in the top f ew
f irms, it is worthwhile contextualizing this dataset. The data f rom the CRSP is the standard data
13

set used by f inancial academics f or the study of equity prices. Below is number of observations,
public securities in the database, in any given 10 year period changes overtime:

Figure 2

The number of securities in the sample bef ore the mid -1960s suggests that there may be some
survivorship bias within the CRSP dataset. This conclusion is also suggested by the kurtosis of
the dataset, a measure which ref lects extreme values in the data set —outliers—or the heavy
tailedness of the distribution. This measure is relevant because the extreme leptokurtic nature of
the data set suggests the extraordinary degree of outliers within the data set, notably, the super
f irms. As seen below, the distribution of wealth creation in any given ten year period is extremely
leptokurtic:

14

Figure 3

The above data indicates that there are extreme outliers, with kurtosis values over 3 being
considered leptokurtic. These f eatures of the data set are important to keep in mind as we look at
the level of concentration of the top f irm, the top f ive f irms and the top twenty f ive f irms. These
examples illustrate the importance of super f irms in any given ten year period.

2.2 Concentration of Wealth Creation in Top Firms
Consider the percentage of gross wealth creation contributed by the top corporate wealth
creator in any given period:
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Figure 4

Clearly, the most important f irm in terms of wealth creation in any given period is a signif icant
aspect to understanding the competitive results of any given 10 year period. The f irm which
produced 21% of all gross corporate wealth between 1926 through 1936 is General Motors, a
measure which is likely exaggerated by the ef f ects of the great depression and survivorship bias
in the early part of the data set. In the most recent period, 4.75% of all U.S. corporate wealth
creation between 2008 and 2018 was App le. In Appendix 1, you can f ind the list of the top
corporate wealth creators in any given period.
The skew in the distribution can be seen when we look at the top f ive and top twenty -f ive
wealth creators as a percent of gross wealth creation:

16

Figure 5

In the last 35 years, one can suggest as a stylized f act that the top f ive wealth creating f irms
create between 15% and 25% of all gross public corporate wealth creation in any given 10 year
period. A similar f eature of the data set can be see in the top twenty f ive wealth creating f irms:
Figure 6

17

A suggested stylized f act here is that in the last 40 years, the top 25 f irms account f or more than
25% and less than 40% of the corporate wealth creation in any given 10 year period.
In addition to the above distribution overtime, there remains other f eatures of the historic
data set which are necessary to keep in mind in the f orthcoming discussion. Looking at the top 15
f irms across the whole period between 1926 through 2017, we see that a number of them
produce very high annualized returns f or very long periods of time:
Table 1

Firm

Start Date

End Date

Total
Wealth
Annualized Creation
Returns
(billions)

Years
in data
set

APPLE INC

1980-12-31

2017-12-29

17.04%

$1,036

37.0

EXXON MOBIL CORP

1925-12-31

2017-12-29

11.66%

$1,011

92.0

MICROSOFT CORP

1986-03-31

2017-12-29

25.49%

$825

31.8

ALPHABET INC

2014-04-30

2017-12-29

20.68%

$537

3.7

AMAZON COM INC

1997-05-30

2017-12-29

38.20%

$536

20.6

IBM

1925-12-31

2017-12-29

13.52%

$525

92.0

JOHNSON & JOHNSON

1944-09-30

2017-12-29

15.64%

$504

73.3

GENERAL ELECTRIC CO

1925-12-31

2017-12-29

9.91%

$503

92.0

ALTRIA GROUP INC

1925-12-31

2017-12-29

17.60%

$489

92.0

WAL MART STORES INC

1972-11-30

2017-12-29

19.00%

$466

45.1

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY

1976-10-29

2017-12-29

22.59%

$443

41.2

GENERAL MOTORS CORP

1925-12-31

2009-06-30

5.63%

$439

83.5

CHEVRON CORP NEW

1925-12-31

2017-12-29

10.95%

$419

92.0

PROCTER & GAMBLE CO

1929-08-30

2017-12-29

10.47%

$386

88.3

COCA COLA CO

1925-12-31

2017-12-29

13.05%

$356

92.0

The top two are very large f irms with high returns, necessarily resulting in being
represented as signif icant wealth creators f or their owners. There are, however, also smaller f irms
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with long periods of superior wealth creation, like the cigarette producer Altria Group with returns
of 17.6% per annum compounded f or 92 years.
A theory of competition must encounter these f eatures of the historic record, namely, the
numerous instances of high annualized returns on capital, the long lengths of time these returns
persist, the resulting signif icant skew in wealth creation, as well as the f act that f irms which once
rank in the top tier of wealth creators later disappear f rom upper ranks, like Kodak, a f irm cited by
Chamberlin in 1933.
It is not possible to explain the above results in their specif icity except by an exacting
analysis of historical records. These results, however, represent the type of stylized f acts which
economic theory, specif ically the theory of competition, must be able to encounter and explain
theoretically. The theory of competition must be able to deal with those f ew f irms which generate
corporate wealth f ar in excess of other f irms. As Bessembinder has written, these results raise
the question about whether existing theory can account f or the degree of concentration in terms
of the creation of corporate wealth. 15 These exceptional f irms, persistent across the entire data
set, determine average returns and other average relationships, like long term return expectati ons
on investment, industry pricing, average quality and expected service levels. In what f ollows, we
will look at whether the theories of competition f rom the literature can explain these historical
results. We will f irst look at static theories of competition and then turn to dynamic theories of
competition.
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3. Static Models of Competition
To understand the rationale f or clearly separating dynamic f rom static competitive
analysis, and moreover the reasons why Schumpeter is f orced to reject stati c analysis, it is
important to review the development of realistic static models of competition. A literature review
must begin with Marshall and his attempt to include increasing returns to scale f rom
manuf acturing into a static model of competition. This is generally seen as a f ailure but how it f ails
and how economic theorists attempt to rectif y the mistakes inf orm the entire debate around
realistic models of competition in static theory. The static approach attempts to include realistic
market structures, such as oligopoly, as well as including realistic cost f unctions, like returns to
scale ef f ects or increasing returns. The static models of competition do not, however, expressly
deal with f undamental uncertainty in the theory of competition, something that was f ormally
introduced by Frank Knight in 1921. In terms of the static approach to competition theory, we will
look at Marshall, Straf f a and Chamberlin as illustrations of the problems which arise in static
economic theory. We will then turn to the d ynamic theories of Young, Knight, Dobb and
Schumpeter.

3.1 Marshall
Marshall provides an analysis of competition with realistic increasing returns to scale in
Chapter XII of Principles of Economics. It is this analysis which, due to its attempt at realism,
helps inspire later critiques which ultimately discredit Marshall’s economics. These f ew pages of
Marshall, while ref lecting only a sliver of Marshall’s work, usef ully f oreshadow a number of
debates regarding the nature of oligopolic markets, static equilibrium and increasing returns.
Marshall separates his analysis into the short and long period, with the short period being
one of f ixed factors and decreasing returns, implying a f ixed number of f irms in the short run. In
20

the long period, it is assumed new f irms are f ormed and increasing returns have their ef f ect. With
manuf actured products, the short period price is set in a realistic dealer market where price
movements are determined by inventories on hand and the expectations of prices in the “next
market.” In the long period f or manuf actured products, however, the average cost will be
decreasing. Firms will, theref ore, experience increasing returns and, in this context, supply can be
theoretically inf inite given the construction of supply and demand curves. 16 This is Cournot’s of t
repeated conclusion that increasing returns in manuf acturing results in monopolies. In reality, we
do not see the creation of absolute monopolies in this f ashion. Theref ore, to f it reality into the
static model, output must be stopped either by having f alling revenue with increasing output or by
increasing costs with increasing output (decreasing returns) to arrive at an equilibrium.
Marshall solves this dilemma in two ways. First, by suggesting that a continuous advance
in supply at decreasing costs will eventually be stopped by a decay in a f irm’s managerial ability
and that, at such times, the increasing returns which “enabled it to rise” will cause it to be
“destroyed.” Secondly, in the context of an industry, f irm’s are co nf ined to their “particular market”
and theref ore “any hasty increase in its production is likely to lower the demand price in that
market out of all proportion to the increased economies that it will gain.” 17
In a f ootnote, Marshall writes that an individual producer f aces not the general demand
curve f or an industry but its own “particular demand curve” f or his own “special market.” This
demand curve will be extremely steep or inelastic which limits the potential application of
increasing returns to scale f or the f irm. Furthermore, Marshall argues that the number of f irms to
which increasing returns are achieved f or long periods of time are “very f ew” and, f urthermore,
that there needs to be a sharp contrast between the economies of scale f or an individual f irm and
f or that of an industry. The important point f or our discussion is that, to Marshall, whatever
monopoly elements may arise are a short run and special phenomenon.
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Clearly, even if monopoly elements are a special phenomenon and that long periods of
increasing return dynamics are f ew, Bessembinder’s stylized results above show that this cannot
be said to be a reason to ignore the f ew f irms which showcase extraordinary perf ormance —those
f ew f irms, af ter all, account f or an important percentage of c orporate wealth creation. Marshall
notes that his analysis requires that general economies f rom new inventions be excluded f rom the
analysis, while also assuming a balance of “progress and decay” between f irms. 18 This analysis,
he writes, cannot be pushed too f ar because, as it:
“...verges on the high theme of economic progress... it is especially needf ul to remember
that economic problems are imperf ectly presented when they are treated as problems of
static equilibrium, and not of organic growth... the statistical theory of equilibrium is only
an introduction to economic studies.”19
Sraf f a, in his f amous critique of Marshall, ignores this admonition and picks up on the notion of a
“special market” f or each f irm. He shows Marshall's conception of equilib rium with increasing
returns is inconsistent, all while suggesting a direction of analysis where monopolistic competition
is assumed to be, not a short run and special case, but a general element of the competitive
environment.

3.2 Sraffa
Sraf f a, in addition to succeeding in his goal that Marshall should be abandoned, was
successf ul in pulling together the problems of increasing returns, such as those raised above, and
presenting a conception of imperf ect or monopolistically competitive markets which was t o
become very inf luential. As Andrews has written, at the time of Sraf f a’s critique, it was possible to
either drop the industrial analysis of Marshall or to drop the concept of static equilibrium itself —
Sraf f a chooses to drop the f ormer. 20
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Sraf f a’s gains prominence, including an invitation by Keynes to teach in the UK, through
showing how Marshall’s partial equilibrium f ramework breaks down when it is extended to simple
conceptions of economies of scale. 21 Sraf f a’s conclusion is that to capture those ef f ects one must
turn to the theory of monopoly as the general theory of competitive behavior. Two empirical
f eatures need to be captured by this new theory of competition Sraf fa writes. First, producers can,
in f act, af f ect the price and are not mere price takers whose output has a negligible ef f ect on the
price. Secondly, producers f ace decreasing costs or constant costs —not increasing costs. 22 The
problem is complicated by the f act that most markets are not o nes of “absolute monopoly.” In
perf ect competition, elasticity of demand is inf inite, in absolute monopoly it is a unity, but in the
intermediate state, a “monopolist” has some control over price but must f orgo some purchasers
when it increases its price. These purchasers shif t their budgets to competing producers or other
goods.
When Straf f a ref ers to the model in Marshall’s f ootnote ref erred to above, the demand
curve f or any particular f irm is a demand curve f or its “special market,” Straf f a extends the
analysis to say that:
“...the possible buyers are entered in descending order according to the price which each
of them is prepared to pay, not rather than go entirely without, but rather than not buy it
f rom that particular producer instead of elsewhere...that is to say, that two elements enter
into the composition of such demand prices-the price at which the goods can be
purchased f rom those other producers who, in the order of a purchaser's pref erence,
immediately f ollow the producer under consideratio n, and the monetary measure of the
value (a quantity which may be positive or negative) which the purchaser puts on his
pref erence f or the products of the f irm in question.” 23
Here two dif f erent types of marginal customers regulate prices —those who are marginal to the
particular f irm’s products, who enf orce the limit by which a particular f irm may increase the price
of its product in its special market, and those who are at the margin of the general market and
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who f ix a limit on the general increase in price. 24 Straf f a notes that the incentives to increase
prof its f rom price increases are more powerf ul than the incentives to increase prof its f rom price
cuts, since the f ormer imply greater prof its f or the f irm and benef it competitors while the latter
does not benef it competitors and calls f orth retaliation.
Straf f a disagrees with the popular conception of an indeterminate equilibrium in the case
of multiple monopolies and cites Edgeworth’s comment that “the extent of indeterminateness'
diminishes with the diminution of the degree of correlation between the articles.” 25 Sraf f a notes
that the degrees of dif ference in the special markets between the individual f irms will indicate the
determinateness of the equilibrium. Any individual case will be determined on the grounds of
dif f erentiation unique to that industry. These results “require only a very slight degree of
pref erence f or a particular f irm in each of the groups of customers.” 26
This slight degree of pref erence, as Chamberlin will argue apparently without inspiration
f rom Sraf f a, can be accomplished through product dif ferentiation. This represents a “tendency,
which prevails even in actual cases where the conditions of the various undertakings dif f er among
each other, whereby the cumulative action of slight obstacles to competition produces on prices
ef f ects which approximate to those of monopoly.” 27
From these observations, a line is usually drawn to Chamberlin and Robinson, both of
whom certainly appear to draw f rom Straf f a’s analysis. Schumpeter writes that Sraf f a’s article led
to the creation of the “English branch of monopolistic competition.” 28 This conclusion is admitted
by Joan Robinson and rejected by Chamberlin who, writing af ter Schumpeter’s death in 1961,
argues that his work was unrelated to the representative f irm and cost critiques of Marshall, of
which Sraf f a is a part. 29 Chamberlin clarif ies the problems involved in moving f rom a general
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market to a collection of separate markets by investigating trademarks and patents and writes
that his analysis is inspired by Allyn Young’s descriptions of trademarks and patents in Outlines of
Economics. Chamberlin presents a novel analysis of trademarks and patents as representing the
semi-permeable barriers between the separate markets in a static equilib rium model of
monopolistic competition.

3.3 Chamberlin
In 1951, Chamberlin writes that the theoretical conclusion of his work is supposed to be
general, in the same sense as Sraf f a’s suggestion f or perf ect competition to be replaced with
monopolistic competition: “Where everything is perf ectly divisible, economies of scale remain
and, in a world of human beings having diversif ied tastes, the f ree play of economic f orces would
necessarily establish monopolistic competition.” 30
Chamberlin sees his work as establishing a general theory of monopolistic competition —
which may explain why he def ended his approach throughout his lif e. 31 Chamberlin builds on the
insight that dif f erentiation allows f or price adjustments above purely competitive prices and that,
in a market with only a f ew sellers, the sellers would recognize their mutual dependence. This
mutual dependence means that a decrease in price to obtain greater market share would result in
competition responding by reducing prices, leaving market share the same as bef ore but with less
prof its. The recognition of this mutual dependence would tend to prevent price based competition,
as that is mutually unprof itable, and result in a tendency to charge what the traf f ic will bear. This
result, he writes, is not a deviation f rom a welf are ideal.
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Chamberlin’s is said to have coined “product dif ferentiation” and his discussion of
trademarks is novel and, in its contrarian conclusions, breaks important new ground by arguing
that trademarks are more monopolistic than patents. He def ines dif ferentiation as f ollows:
“Dif f erentiation may be based upon certain characteristics of the product itself , such as
exclusive patented f eatures; trade-marks; trade names; peculiarities of the package or
container, if any; or singularity in quality, design, color, or style. It may also exist with
respect to the conditions surrounding its sale.” 32
These represent the principal variables which competitors may adjust in terms of their “product.”
Adjusting the “conditions surrounding sale” implies that the variables available to the seller or
producer includes the specif ic process of distribution. Including conditions surrounding sale
allows Chamberlin to note that all products are at least slightly dif ferentiated and thus all
competition should be viewed as monopolistic. There is no such thing as an absolute monopoly
“as long as there are substitute [p roducts] to any degree imperf ect, he still has a monopoly of his
own product and control over its price within the limits imposed upon any monopolist —those of
demand.”33 Real world prices represent an individual position between monopoly and competition
which is “determined with ref erence to the relative strength of the two f orces” —a “purely
competitive price is not a normal price.”34 The argument is that monopoly, as f ar as Chamberlin
understands it, does not imply higher prices than similar products, “nor prof its higher than the
ordinary rate.”35
Chamberlin’s discussion of patents and trademarks sets the stage f or his “special market”
concept. Given that trademarks and advertising are important tools of corporate strategy, a
concept important in our discussion of Schumpeter, we will highlight Chamberlin’s contributions
here. Chamberlin argues that patents, while clearly monopolistic f or specific components of
articles, are usually only ef f ective at shutting out competition f or near substitutes when all the
important patents are acquired by a single f irm, with only less perf ect substitutes providing
32
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competition. In addition to this limitation in the monopoly elements of patents, they can also be
considered to generate f urther competitive f orces through the incentive to obtain the patent itself .
Chamberlin goes against the general view that trademarks are less monopolistic than
patents and cites Allyn Young by saying a f irm:
“...may be able to lif t himself a little above the “dead level” of competition [thro ugh
trademarks]...he is...able to obtain what might be called a quasi-monopoly. But because
the control the price of his product is in general much more limited than a true
monopolist, and because competition limits and conditions his activities in other ways, his
business is more properly called competitive than monopolistic.” 36
Chamberlin, at this stage in his argument, cites f ive specif ic brands whose trade marks are clearly
so valuable 1933 as to question the general assumption that patents are more p owerf ul than
trademarks. It is interesting to observe that three of the f ive brands he cites in 1933, Coca-cola,
Kodak, and Ivory (introduced by Proctor and Gamble in 1879), were owned by 3 f irms in the top
15 most wealth generating f irms between 1926 and 1970. Two of the f ive remain in the top 15
through 2017. The f irm to drop out of the top 15 was Kodak, established in 1888 and holding a
huge market position in f ilm and cameras until the 1980s when it was unable to transition its
business with the advent of digital photography and f oreign competition. The f irm is now
considered a classic example of Schumpeterian creative destruction.
The traditional theory of monopolistic pricing focuses on a single f irm’s equilibrium. A
theory of monopolistic competition must ref er to a “group equilibrium” of dif ferent monopolies. 37
Chamberlin’s goal is to “give weight” to the “degree of isolation that exists by f ocusing attention
on the market of the individual seller.”38
Chamberlin presents two models, a large group monopolistic competition model and a
small group, or oligopoly, model. In his f ormal models, the degree of separation, which results in
sales levels, are limited to three variables: price, product and advertising expenses. Allowing f or
product as a qualitative variable is novel —although Schumpeter will argue this is not enough —as
36
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is his inclusion of advertising outlays, which also introduces numerous theoretical dif f iculties. The
product variable encompasses: “technical changes, a new design, or better materials; it may
mean a new package or container; it may mean more prompt or courteous services, a dif f erent
way of doing business, or perhaps a new location.” 39 Chamberlin is aware of the limitations of this
approach and notes that qualitative variations of a p roduct cannot be captured on a single
diagram—one might realistically question if it can be captured on diagrams at all. 40
The ability to shif t demand by advertising exists because of imperf ect knowledge of
buyers and the possibility of altering wants by advertising. It also ends the independence of the
supply curve on the demand curve, which Chamberlin recognizes. To arrive at a group
equilibrium, prices and products must be varied. Prices may be adjusted f or product, product may
be adjusted f or prices, although prices are assumed to be “of ten a relatively unimportant phase”
in the competitive process. “Price competition is evaded by turning the buyer’s attention towards
a trade-mark, or by competing on the basis of quality or service” or by advertising. 41 The complete
picture of competition would see every element of product subject to adjustment —and this
includes, to emphasize, location, price, quality, service, etc. There can be a heterogeneity of
prices in the market because of the nature of product variations —not to mention dif ferences in
cost curves and elasticities of demand. 42 Variations here are assumed to be temporary and are
viewed as constantly being eliminated. Chamberlin’s f ocus is those relationships which “persist
over a long period of time,” although the results of any market are unique —“imperf ections of
competition [are] not unif orm.”43 This is to say, competition is always leveling boh prof its and
product dif ferentiation.
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If new competition “invades” an existing market and market share cannot be “wrested
f rom them with equal f acility,” or if some markets are “virtually unaf f ected by an invasion of the
general f ield,” he writes, “[then] their monopoly prof its are beyond the reach of competition.’ 44 He
concludes that these variations “give no real dif f iculty in the end.”
Chamberlin’s large group model is designed to replace perf ect competition models. His
less well developed small group model is his oligopoly model. To obtain his results in both cases,
Chamberlin waves away increasing returns by assuming all f irms have the same cost structures.
He assumes that prof its are set at the level which is “just adequate to maintain the amount” of
competition, to avoid introducing new competition since there is f ree entry. 45 This latter point
becomes an important matter of debate but our intention is not to critique Chamberlin. A ll of this,
of course, implies that there are ef f ective substitute products. For us, this is the crux of the matter.
If substitutes, however, are not ef f ective, then prof its may still be higher —and “this is the
explanation of all monopoly profits, of whatever sort,” he writes. 46 In this domain appears to be
the types of f irms responsible f or the extreme returns highlighted in Bessembinder. The items
that, to Chamberlin, can prevent substitute competing products are: (1) strong customer
pref erences combined with patents, copyrights and trademarks, (2) “peculiarities'' of the
establishment which cannot be duplicated, (3) “reputation, skill and special ability.” 47 Chamberlin
then says that “the competitive theory of rent explains dif ferences in income in so f ar as they arise
f rom such a source” but “f urther dif ferences are accounted f or only by the theory of monopoly.” 48
These elements result in “limitations on the ef f ectiveness of substitutes to diminish prof its within
certain portions of the f ield.”49
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It would seem that Chamberlin’s analysis is inapplicable to our problems since it appears
to put the f ew extreme corporate wealth creators outside of his theory. He puts their analysis into
the theory of competitive rents. Only his notion of product differentiation and his f inal comments
about markets where perf ect substitutes are prevented are usef ul in explaining the results of
Bessembinder. By pointing to the theo ry of rents, however, an important question is raised: how
are f irms which experience competitive rents regulated in the long run? Ultimately, in a
painstaking 1937 review of the marginalist theories of imperf ect competition, John Hick’s
concludes that their applicability to practical analysis is limited. 50
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4. Dynamic Models of Competition
Straf f a’s comments on increasing returns were part of a broader discussion which was
held throughout the 1920s, ref erred to today as the cost controversies. These debates stimulated
Allyn Young to express his own views around increasing returns while examining the division of
labor, progress and the extent of the market. Embedded within his views are the f aint outlines of a
theory of enterprise, industries and competition in the context of increasing returns. The viewpoint
expressed is a realistic model of disequilibrium, entrepreneurs and expectations. We begin with
Young because of his close association with Knight’s thesis on uncertainty and because he is
developing a dynamic model where progress is closely associated with increasing returns, a view
like Schumpeter’s writings of the same month in 1928. Both men are discussing increasing
returns as the source of progress within a dynamic model, albeit with dif ferent p oints of emphasis.
Young and Schumpeter’s view of progress and increasing returns represent the actual
environment which Frank Knight is seeking to explain in his discussion of real world prof its,
imperf ect competition and the epistemic problems f acing ec onomic actors, most notably, the
problem of uninsurable and unf oreseeable change or f undamental uncertainty. Uncertainty
comes f rom rapid economic change, which, as Dobb argues more explicitly, comes f rom
entrepreneurs creating new divisions of labor and thereby increasing returns. The problem of
uncertainty, arising f rom increasing returns and change, becomes the most critical aspect of any
dynamic competitive model.
Dobb’s contribution in this essay is his theory of competitive rents, which Chamberlin may
have in mind when he brief ly ref ers to them. Dobb’s discussion is relevant because it raises the
question of how prof it positions are maintained and he answers that they are maintained by
slowing the response of competition through “advantages” cumulativ ely derived f rom supplying a
31

scarce resource. Despite notions of cumulation, Dobb’s analysis is still set in an equilibrium world,
with dynamic elements. Importantly, in Dobbs analysis, Knight and early Schumpeter are merely
short run theories explaining prof its bef ore the increase in competition—these theories still need
to deal with what one might call the middle and long period of competition.
Finally, we will turn to Schumpeter and show how his later work is an elaboration and
reaction to the ideas so f ar presented with the addition of a concept of business strategy to
manage the f undamental uncertainty which is the result of progressive and widespread increasing
returns, allowing, as they do, f or the creation of new entrepreneurs, new strategies and new
markets.
We will argue that Schumpeter’s theory of regulative strategy implies that f irm’s act in an
instrumentally rational way to manage the f undamental uncertainty of investment and that
Schumpeter’s theory of competition best explains the actual his tory of competition, market
structures, and the long run positive skew of returns on f inancial capital as demonstrated in US
capital markets. This is to say, Schumpeter’s theory, understood in its proper intellectual context,
represents the most f lexible theory to explain the stylized f acts which have been derived f rom
Bessembinder and our extension of Bessembinder.
The regulative strategy which f irms f ollow in the Schumpeterian competitive process is a
means to continuously and progressively lower the f undamental uncertainty f acing prof its on
investment. In the short run, prof its emerge due to better anticipations and innovation. They are
then maintained through strategy, as elaborated in Dobb and Schumpeter. Assuming prof it
positions are maintained the question is, then, of how is capital and prof its regulated in the long
run, af ter protections of profit positions have been built up? This question appears to be only
answered clearly by Schumpeter, where he draws on his analysis of monopolistic competition,
uncertainty and increasing returns. The regulating f orce in the long run of monopolistically
competitive capitalism is “creative destruction.” We will argue that creative destruction can only
be understood as the theoretical complement of regulative strat egies to manage uncertainty

32

driven by the increasing returns environment. Together they f orm a dynamic theory of competition
which can f ulf ill the traditional role of competition in economic theory.

4.1 Allyn Young
Allyn Young’s 1928 essay on economic pro gress and increasing returns represented a
view he had been harboring since helping Frank Knight with his PhD thesis in the 1910s. 51 Young
does not believe that economic progress, and specif ically the phenomenon of increasing returns,
can be understood in the context of equilibrium. 52 Internal economies of scale which a f irm is able
to achieve by increasing output, to take the most simple example, can be used to lower the price
of their product, which lowers the cost of inputs f or other f irms, resulting in external economies f or
that f irm and a continuous process of disequilibrium. Schumpeter voices similar opinions in his
“The Instability of Capitalism” published in September 1928, the month of Young’s speech.
Young’s views can be seen as, in part, f illing out the background conditions f or Knight’s
views on uncertainty, as well as providing a technical compliment to Schumpeter’s point of view
on innovation. For Young, increasing returns through the division of labor are the source of
general progress and a source of disequilibrium. Young’s differences f rom Schumpeter’s point of
view are largely in terms of emphasis and semantics: Young f ocuses on market size and how it
enables new roundabout methods of production, whereas Schumpeter f ocuses on
entrepreneurship as leadership and the introduction of new things in the circular f low.
Schumpeter categorizes most “increasing returns” under the heading of “innovation,” writing that:
“Innovation, unless it consists in producing, and f orcing upon the public, a new commodity,
means producing at [a] smaller cost per unit, breaking of f the old "supply schedule" and starting
on a new one.”53
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For Young, not all of the economies which can be called “external” to one f irm can be
accounted f or as internal to other f irms, since some of these economies are driven f rom
qualitative improvements in product and the division of labor. Efficiencies which are external to a
f irm are both quantitative, in the simple sense of the already mentioned internal economies of
scale passed along f rom suppliers, as well as qualitative in the sense of the structure of the
external economy itself ; in other words, economies f rom new products and new methods of
production or organization. This disequilibrium, he writes, is characteristic of the economy
external to a f irm. 54
The most important economies which result in increasing returns are “capitalistic” or
“round about” economies.55 The f orces which would bring the economy to equilibrium are
“continuously def eated” by economies of scale, as well as being def eated by “new or adventitious
elements.”56 Young writes:
“Every important advance in the organisation of production, regardless of whether it is
based upon anything which, in a narrow or technical sense, would be called a new
‘invention,’ or involves a f resh application of the f ruits of scientific progress to industry,
alters the conditions of industrial activity and initiates responses elsewhere in the
industrial structure which in turn have a f urther unsettling ef f ect. Thus change becomes
progressive and propagates itself in a cumulative way.” 57
Young notes that even if we suppose a f rictionless, perf ectly economical process not requiring
trial and error, there will be a limiting pace with which progress can be made, partially limited by
the capital accumulation necessary to advance methods and products, and partially limited
because:
“...the demand f or some products is inelastic, or, with an increasing supply, soon
becomes so...In most f ields, moreover, progress is not and cannot be continuous. The
next important step f orward is of ten initially costly, and cannot be taken until a certain
quantum of prospective advantages have been accumulated.” 58
instability of a different order and are largely from innovation and indivisibilities. Decreasing and increasing returns simply
are not symmetrical concepts. Schumpeter’s solution to the Marshallian cost controversies is to separate the increasing
and decreasing returns debate to their respective spheres of dynamic and static analysis.
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A certain “quantum of prospective advantages” being required f or new investment will be echoed
by Schumpeter and it is f air to view this as a theoretical concept whic h has its analytic f unction in
a dynamic or development theory where investment f aces f undamental uncertainty and requires
inducements to overcome this uncertainty. 59
While noting that one shouldn’t assign a single f actor to the leading role in economic
progress, Young asks: “is there any other f actor which has a better claim to that role than the
persistent search f or markets? No other hypothesis so well unites economic history and economic
theory.”60
Af ter the historic transition f rom commerce to industry in the industrial revolution, Young
writes, commerce became an agent of industry and now the “f inding of markets” is an important
task of industry. This represents one of Young's important views, crucial to understanding the
relationship between roundabout specialization, allowing f or increasing returns, and market size.
He had already taken this position in a chapter written in 1924 titled “The creator of wealth” where
the title ref ers to trade - not invention, land or labor. 61
Thus, the search f or new markets to reach scale, combined with a certain quantum of
advantages, is required f or new capitalistic and roundabout means of production. Young writes of
this theory of enterprise:
“The great change, I imagine, is in the new importance which the potential market has in
the planning and management of large industries...Potential demand, then, in the
planning of industrial undertakings, has to be balanced against potential economies,
elasticity of demand against decreasing costs. The search f or markets is not a matter of
disposing of a “surplus product,” in the Marxian sense, but of f inding an outlet f or a
potential product. Nor is it wholly a matter of multiplying prof its by multiplying sales; it is
partly a matter of augmenting prof its by reducing costs. ..How f ar ‘selling expenses,’ f or
example, are to be counted [in] economic waste depends upon their ef f ects upon the
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aggregate product of industry, as distinguished f rom their ef f ects upon the f ortunes of
particular undertakings.”62
Clearly, here are the outlines of a theory of enterprise and its relationship to industry, together
f orming a partial picture of the competitive process. The scale of the end market determines what
types of division of labor, or specialization and roundabout methods, can be emp loyed. He writes:
“The degree in which [a f irm] can secure economies by making its own operations more
roundabout is limited. But certain roundabout methods are f airly sure to become f easible
and economic when their advantages can be spread over the output of the whole
industry. These potential economies, then, are segregated and achieved by the
operations of a specialized undertakings which, taken together, constitute a new
industry.“63
Specialist f irms can become suppliers or vendors to an existing industry by providing a service
which is more ef f icient than that which could be provided by any individual f irms in that industry
internally —that is, only specialists can achieve certain economies of scale by providing their
service to the industry as a whole, as only this scale of end market allows f or these types of
economies of scale.
The search f or potential markets—with selling costs and advertising —is not just about
shif ting the demand curve, problematic in terms of any static analysis, but to achieve potential
economies of scale in the context of specializing f irms. Unlike in Chamberlin where advertising
exists to alter pref erences, and selling costs are relegated to costs in production f rom
dif f erentiation, the implication in Young is that advertising exists to expand and ef f iciently tap a
potential market f or a f irm’s products. Young’s views correspond to the later views of Philip
Andrews, as well as to academic business history. 64 This allows f or a more capitalistic processes
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of production, allowing f or increasing returns at the f irm level and, assuming these ef f iciencies are
propagated to their customers, altering the budget composition for custom ers. This is the realistic
environment which allows f or new combinations f rom a continuously changing environment of
long term payof f s.
It is f air to view Young’s dynamic model of increasing returns as a model of circular and
cumulative causation where, quoting Toner, “growth in productivity and growth in output are
interdependent and self -reinf orcing.”65
Frank Knight wrote to Allyn Young about this paper saying that he should have made a
clearer distinction between static and dynamic models. 66 To this Young replied that:
“...[the] purely static view does not interest me very much, because if it is rigorously
adhered to, almost everything worth saying about it can be put onto a f ew page...I should
hold that the conditions of an equilibrium rate of change af f ord just as appropriate a
hunting ground f or ‘pure theory’ as the conditions of static equilibrium do.” 67
Young never got a chance to elaborate on this idea and throw it into some “simple and stable
mechanism,” or to work f rom a “generalization to the f acts and f rom the f acts back to new
generalizations in a way which blends deduction and induction,” as he once described the work of
an economist. 68 There is, however, a whole approach here where, as biographer Charles Blitch
puts it, “growth is demand-determined, with increases in the size of the market generating capital
investment, external economies and increasing returns, which in turn, expand the market so that
the process is cumulative.”69 There are, as well, outlines of a theory of comp etition where f irms
plan f or potential markets and potential economies of scale. Employing selling costs and

buffer which, in times of stress, can be reduced without a sacrifice of sales for a limited period. See Charles Wilson, The
History of Unilever: a Study in Economic Growth and Social Change (London, England: Cassell, 1970), p. 57 - 58.
65

Phillip Toner, Main Currents in Cumulative Causation: the Dynamics of Growth and Development (Basingstoke,
Hampshire: Macmillan, 1999), p. 162.
66

Blitch, Allyn Young, p. 176.

67

Ibid.

68

Allyn A. Young, “Economics as a Field of Research,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 42, no. 1 (1927): p. 1,
https://doi.org/10.2307/1885362, 25.
69

Blitch, Allyn Young, p. 177.
37

advertising are necessary to expand its market so as to obtain the scale required to employ
capitalistic and roundable strategies to achieve these economies.

4.2 Frank Knight
When Frank Knight was writing his thesis in the years bef ore 1921, he wrote that the
theory of perf ection competition requires increasing costs because, if not, a f irm could scale to
absolute monopoly by achieving increasing returns to scale—Cournot’s position, in other words.
In such a situation, perf ect competition requires new supply to come in the f orm of new f irms, he
claimed. Allyn Young, his adviser, pointedly noted that some economies are only possibly f rom a
large demand, most importantly economies f rom “highly specialized establishments,” and that:
“I dif f er f rom your notion of decreasing costs. I hold them to be real, not necessarily
tending to monopoly, and one of the most important economic phenomenon of modern
times. They are not a matter of ‘proportioning of factors.’ They are, in great part, a matter
of the economies of the division of labor, which as Adam Smith observed, is limited by
the ‘extent of the market.’”70
Knight’s views, however, were that specializatio n and the division of labor—and consequently
increasing returns, progress and history —are a theme outside of static theory. Instead, it is part of
dynamic theory, which Knight later suggests we call evolutionary theory or historical theory. 71
His Ph.D. thesis introduces another important element of realism which, when combined
with and understood in context of Young’s increasing returns, lay the groundwork f or better
understanding Schumpeter’s theory of monopolistic competition. Knight writes that the “pro blem
of prof it is one way of looking at the problem of the contrast between perf ect competition and
actual competition,” with the greater part of his thesis being f ocused on how imperf ect competition
and prof it arise due to uncertainty. 72 One result of his thesis was the widely accepted def initions
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of “risk” as f oreseeable, regular, measurable and insurable change, and “uncertainty” as
immeasurable, unf oreseeable and uninsurable change.
Fundamental uncertainty is the result of rapid economic change which, as Dobb will
argue more explicitly than Knight, comes f rom entrepreneurs who f urther the division of labor,
resulting in increasing returns. This rapid economic change continuously alters the f ield of play
wherein adaptation and correct anticipation explains short run prof its.
Knight’s def initions of risk and uncertainty were widely applied af ter his book, f or
instance, in Keynes’ The General Theory.73 Prior ref erences to “risk” in the literature, such as in
Smith, Mill and Marx, ref er to both risk and uncertainty. Further def initional cleaves have been
suggested, f or instance, in the last book by Hicks and Dequech. 74 Arrow writes that Knightian
uncertainty might potentially be def ined as when it is impossible to determine priors in a Baysian
context. 75 This essay cannot explore these and other reactions. The f ocus here is on the
exploration of imperf ect competition in Frank Knight where prof its and imperf ect market structures
arise due to the f act of more or less able actors encountering the epistemic problems of
f undamental uncertainty, including the uncertainty f rom hierarchical ef f ects in management’s
ability to judge other people’s ability to manage uncertainty.
In looking at how actual markets deviate f rom perf ect markets, change as such needs to
be seperated f rom unf oreseeable change, as only the latter can create opportunities f or
dif f erences in ability to better anticipate the f uture. Knight writes that,
“We live only by knowing something about the f uture; while the problems of lif e, or of
conduct at least, arise f rom the f act that we know so little… The essence of the situation
is action according to opinion, of greater or less f oundation and value, neither entire
ignorance nor complete and perf ect inf ormation, but partial knowledge.” 76
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Knight spends a great deal of time writing about the problems of “action according to opinion,”
about how we have an imperf ect image of the world in our minds and that when we act, we
project an imagined f uture extending out f rom our already imperf ectly im aged state of the world.
On this basis, we make guesses about how our actions will change this imagined f uture.
The implication is that we estimate the results of our actions imperf ectly and, even then,
only f rom one imagined state of the world to another imagined state. In addition to the challenges
which must arise in such a process, we also simply error once we decide to take action. What is
presented to consciousness, in Knight, is “more a product of inf erence, more an imaginative
construct than a direct communication” with reality. 77
The problem is one of the human mind encountering the f act that the f uture is yet to be
created and that the important f actors and inf luences are unknown in the present. His discussion
touches on the subjects of probability, noting that consequential business decisions cannot be
statistical because they cannot be classif ied into groups f rom which one is able to establish
regularities and, of course, business decisions are dif ferent f rom the logical deductive or a priori
probabilities f ound in games. Business decisions, like the decisions in common lif e, are made
with rough estimates of the f uture—”estimate of an estimate”—and their nature is that there is “no
valid basis of any kind f or classif ying instances.” 78 And these estimates, however, are not without
some dif f erences in ability between business men —f or Knight’s theory is, in part, built on the
basis of there being dif f erences in ability in encountering uncertainty. “It is,” Knight writes , “this
true uncertainty which by preventing the theoretically perf ect outworking of the tendencies of
competition gives characteristic f orm of “enterprise” to economic organization as a whole and
accounts f or the peculiar income of the entrepreneur.” 79
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In this context, rational action necessitates taking steps to reduce the uncertainty: “...in
attempting to act “intelligently” we are attempting to secure adaptation, which means f oresight, as
perf ect as possible.”80 These methods include (1) grouping of cases or decisions, (2) specializing
in making certain types of decisions, (3) control over the f uture, (4) increased power of prediction,
e.g., through better inf ormation and (5) methods of dif fusing the costs of mistakes. 81 He observes
that the economic system is designed so that the producer f orecasts the needs of its customers in
advance, rather than working f rom the basis of customer orders, and the producer is able to do
this because it is producing f or a statistical market whose behavior is more predictable than any
given purchaser within this market. 82 It is also worth observing here that this taxonomy represents
a means of analyzing and classif ying the “regulative strategies” of Schumpeter’s monopolistic
competition and, more importantly, in considering ways to limit the advantages of dominant f irms
f or purposes of policy within existing law—f or instance, by limiting the secrecy and inf ormational
advantages of dominant f irms by f orcing greater disclosure under existing securities laws, thereby
weakening their ability to have “contro l over the f uture” and providing inf ormation to competitors
about investment opportunities they may be overlooking.
Knight writes that the possibility of further grouping of decisions subject to uncertainty
constitute an additional incentive to the scaling of an enterprise, besides mere economies of
scale. It may justif y borrowings to extend business, if it allows f or greater scope and grouping of
business decisions, making the uncertainty of decisions less uncertain as a group. 83
Specialization is a means of increasing and grouping the decisions made by a specif ic f irm,
manager or entrepreneur. By specializing in certain types of decisions, the quality of decisions will
increase through practice. Knight overlooks it but, it is clear, increased scale and num ber of
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decisions under an improving decision maker would amount to an “increasing return” due to the
sharpening of specialization and the better grouping of decisions.
The most powerf ul “methods f or dealing with uncertainty [is] by securing better
knowledge of and control over the f uture.”84 This may be f rom having better inf ormation about
what is going on in the economic system. It may be in terms of the ability to shape the f uture by
shaping expectations with actions, e.g., through demoralizing investments. Furthermore, f irms
f requently acquire through merger innovative competitors, typically incorporating the new of f ering
within their own business or product, thereby controlling new innovation in their market through
acquisition.
At this point in Knight’s argument, all of the af orementioned problems are scaled up to
the problem that entrepreneurs must themselves select managers who they believe will be good
at managing f undamental uncertainty. “Business judgment,” he writes, “is chief ly judgment of
men.”85 Specialization occurs to ensure that those who are best able to manage uncertainty are
placed in the responsible position to do so.
Prof its arise, in this model, f rom uncertainty and f rom some managers better anticipating
their markets. For Knight, the income of society is divided between contractual incomes, or rent,
and residual incomes, i.e., prof its. 86 “The entrepreneur’s income is not ‘determined’ at all,” he
writes, “it is ‘what is lef t’ af ter the others are ‘determined.’” 87 Making prof its rests on believing you
can contract services in advance, guaranteeing payment, and then securing a market in a way
which produces a residual. This anticipated excess —the prof it or residual —is a matter of the
correctness of judgment or the f ailure of judgment on the part of his competitors. 88 These prof its
need not have some specif ic relationships with the capital required to obtain them since they are
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merely a residual of correctly anticipating a market and having previously contracted f or services.
In summation, Knight writes:
“the background element of the problem should now be clear: the uncertainty of all lif e
and conduct which calls f or the exercise of judgment in business, the economy of division
of labor which compels men to work in groups and to delegate f unction of control as other
f unctions are specialized, the f acts of human nature which make it necessary f or one who
directs the activities of others to assume responsibility f or the results of operations, and
f inally the competitive situation which pits the judgment of each entrepreneur against that
of the extent business world in adjusting the contractual incomes which he must pay
bef ore he gets anything himself .”89
The residual prof it f or any f irm is the result of making payments to f actors at the established
competitive rates and selling at the highest value obtainable in their own market. Fundamentally,
in Knight, this comes f rom better anticipation of their market.
When it comes to the level of prof it across industry, Knight writes that the main ef f ect
here is the:
“...rashness or timidity of entrepreneurs (actual or potential) as a class in bidding up the
prices of productive services. Entrepreneur income, being residual, is determined by the
demand f or other services, which demand is a matter of the self -conf idence of
entrepreneurs as a class, rather than upon a demand f or entrepreneur services in a direct
sense.”90
Clearly, there is a resemblance here between those ideas derived by accounting identity, such as
in Kalecki and Steindl, where entrepreneurial prof its are determined by entrepreneurial
investment, less their consumption. Furthermore, this “self -conf idence of entrepreneurs” is
undoubtedly the “state of conf idence” or the “animal spirits" within “the state of long term
expectations” of Keynes.
At this juncture, it is appropriate to note that, in this theory of prof its, entrepreneurs would
need to have a continuous stream of correct judgments about the f uture f or prof its to continue to
emerge. That is to say, Knight’s explanation of prof its is a short run t heory only. It is a theory of
prof it f rom change, not a theory of prof it from “risk.” Schumpeter writes that Knight’s conception of
prof it and uncertainty, combined with an analysis of dif ferential ability “achieved a synthesis that
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is not open to the main objection against the ordinary type of risk theories” and that “[a] f urther
step in the same direction was taken by Dobb.” 91 Schumpeter later ref ers to Knight and Dobb side
by side and it will be seen that Schumpeter’s theory of “regulating strategies” can be considered a
variation of Dobb’s ideas around how f irms slow or restrict the response of competition.

4.3 Maurice Dobb
Monopoly advantages, in Dobb’s Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress, exist when
there is a “dif f erential advantage, due to sup erior opportunity” f rom being a supplier of scarce
service. 92 “Deliberate or intentional monopoly” are actions designed to render or keep something
scarce—although this is not to say that the situation is less of a welf are ideal than that which was
previously obtained. Having these advantages f rom scarcity allows f or additive advantages in
bargaining and, combined, result in a slower response f rom competition, allowing f or any prof its
initially obtained through an entrepreneur better anticipating the market a la Knight to be kept
above the level of prof its which would be obtained under long run perf ect competition. Dobb
writes that “monopoly...is the Aladdin’s lamp to wealth...the history of the growth of riches will be
in large part the history of monopoly in its development in various f orms.”93
Dobb later says that Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress, his f irst book, was
“unsuccessf ul and jejune” in trying to express “Marxist insights with a Marshallian vocabulary” but
it nevertheless appears to be a worthwhile attempt of f ormulating a concept of persistent
“competitive rent” such as that ref erred to above in Chamberlin. 94 The analysis can also be
criticized f or not thoroughly separating the static and dynamic modes of analysis, which is explicit
in Knight and Schumpeter. It is worthwhile to overlook this, in our view, so as to f ocus on how
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f irms may slow the response of competition in a context of Knightian uncertainty and Knightian
prof its.
Monopolistically competitive market structures, f or Dobb, do not imply that resources are
distributed f arther f rom ideal than they otherwise would be because, he writes, a monopol istically
competitive f irm may f acilitate a new division of labor. 95 Theref ore, a monopolistically competitive
f irm may be constructive in that sense, as well potentially being destructive through the process
of restricting output or competition. They may be benef icial in youth and harmf ul in old age.
The entrepreneur in Dobb anticipates a potential market under conditions of uncertainty,
like in Frank Knight, although with greater emphasis on novelty and the creation of new divisions
of labor, as in Schumpeter and Young. Rapid economic change arises f rom the actions of
entrepreneurs. The entrepreneurs' gains are f rom being a pioneer and providing a new service
through the division of labor. Echoing Knight he writes:
“Uncertainty will occur when the course o f events is incalculable or unf oreseeable; and it
will be economic change, introducing something new, which will contain the greatest
incalculable element. Every kind of economic activity will be exposed to the occurrence of
economic losses.”96
Uncertainty, being generated by the actions of innovative entrepreneurs, creates: “a f uture that is
dif f erent f rom the past [and] cuts away the basis—generalizations f rom past experience—f or a
calculation of f uture probabilities.”97 Progress depends on the willingness to make judgments on
the basis of “meagre evidence”—it can be seen as non-ergodic.
Dobb sees Knight’s analysis as a Marshallian short period analysis where the supply of
competitors is f ixed, allowing f or these better anticipations to create temporary prof its. In the long
period, Dobb argues, there would remain a tendency f or prof its to be “normal,” or rather “they will
tend to that level which is suf f icient to attract the requisite competition.” 98 The actual level of
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prof its in this model would be determined by the Marshallian “supply-price” of entrepreneurs. If
the “price” must be high to stimulate competition, profits will be high. Dobb continues:
“...the chief consideration in f inding the cause of supply -price of [entrepreneurs], and
hence of the level of prof its in general and in particular industries, is the ease or dif f iculty
with which new undertakers are f orthcoming —the limitations on their supply.”99
The elements which determine the “supply-price” of entrepreneurs is the minimum supply-price
and the elasticity or responsiveness of this supply. The minimum supply -price can be thought of
as the rate of interest, the cost of education of the entrepreneur, and the average expectation of
prof its.
Assuming this minimum is obtained, the responsiveness of entrepreneurial competition or
the responsiveness of the supply—which, when slack, implies greater prof its—is determined by
(1) the rarity of the specif ic abilities required f or some market, (2) education f or the specif ics of
the market, (3) the initial capital required f or the undertaking being available, (4) lack of
knowledge of the market or the “the lack of knowledge of the true possibilities of undertaking
except f or the privileged f ew with ‘insider inf ormation,’” (5) legal protections or advantages, which
we take to be inclusive of trademarks, and (6) business connections and goodwill. 100 Since this
last f eature applies especially to large f irms with estab lished reputations, this gives established
f irms an additional advantage when approaching new markets, e.g., “this very f act, by raising a
new barrier to competition, places established f irms in a partially protected position.” 101 Clearly,
when the response of entrepreneurs to prof its is slowed, due to a combination of the above
reasons, the apparently temporary prof its obtained in the Knightian sense persist.
This analysis of prof its turns to the idea of dif ferential rents. All prices have within them
some aspects of rent f rom an imperf ect response of supply to demand and, thus, every market
can be seen to have some degree of inelasticity. This “dif f erential advantage...it seems
convenient to describe as a scarcity or monopoly gain.” 102 In addition to any advantages one has
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f rom being able to supply a scarce resource, there are bargaining advantages, such as controlling
the timing of sale, superior inf ormation, greater f acility in multiple markets, and scale. 103
In this context, prof it is a species of monopoly advantage and “prof it” is here inclusive of
capital appreciation. The prof it will be due to the limitation on the f acility of supply or the
responsiveness of competition to high prices. In the context of economic change, each of these
advantages become increasingly important. The entrepreneur is the disturber of equilibrium, they
are “a dynamic f orce itself , ef fecting new groupings of resources with the aim of lowering costs
and widening the market to which he can supply utilities.” 104 He writes:
“When a change occurs which brings an increased net product to the economic system,
the whole of this gain at f irst accrues to the undertaker since he receives the margin
between selling-price and cost. Only as the f orce of competition reduces selling prices or
raises costs will he be f orced to part with this gain to other sections of the community. A
very important f actor will, theref ore, be the length of time it takes f or competition of new
undertakers to have ef f ect. The existence of certain limitations on the entry of new
undertakers will tend to lengthen this period of time…” 105
For Dobb, economists who only look at the long run of equilibrium are missing the big picture. All
these ef f ects are cumulative, f or instance, as in the access to credit. 106 The advantages which are
gained have a tendency to “increase cumulatively, ceteris paribus.” 107 By being able to borrow,
the entrepreneur:
“...has an increased power of extending his business, securing economies of
organization, building up a commercial connection and ‘goodwill,’ accumulating reserves
against hard times or a competitive struggle, and f acing larger uncertainties than he
f ormally dared. This, in so f ar as it is general, may cause the monopoly position of
existing undertakers to be strengthened through an increase in the limitations on the
entry of new rivals. Larger capital may be needed in the f uture f or new men in that line of
enterprise; and the task and hazard of the newcomer may be increased.” 108
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Within this, one can see a number of Knightian aspects c ome through—e.g., the ability to manage
more uncertainty through scale. Marx, Dobb writes, charged 19th century economists as being
blind to capital “as a transf erable monopoly right, the product of differential advantage, not of
abstinence.”109 They were also blinded, he writes, “to the inf luence of the cumulative tendency of
monopoly in the development of capitalist undertaking.” 110 He continues:
“They do not appear to have noticed (except in the case of land) that the possession of a
dif f erential advantage opens opportunity of securing additional advantages in the f uture,
and may thereby cause the major gains of social progress to be acquired by those
possessed of [these] property-rights.”111
For the purposes of this thesis, Dobb has provided a novel analysis of competition
overtime with a f ew important points of emphasis. First, what matters f or the medium and long
term level of profits is the responsiveness of new supply or the responsiveness of new
competition to market prices which are all seen to contain an element of rent. If the response of
competition is slowed, then prof its derived f rom better anticipating change and creating new
divisions of labor can be made to persist. Secondly, he has combined this with a notion of
additional advantages f rom bargaining and maneuv er, f urther slowing the ability of a competitor to
catch up. Third, he brings into context the cumulative aspects of the competitive process.
Dobb’s later discussions of monopolistic competition, f or instance in his 1967 book
Political Economy and Capitalism, neglect to mention his own earlier analysis as well as
mentioning that much of the work on imperf ect competition, specifically advertising analysis,
undermines both static equilibrium and subjective value theory. There he notes that the theories
of imperf ect competition are of three types: (1) theories that merely introduce a delay to the
achieving the long term equilibrium of perf ect competition, (2) theories which of f er a new long
term equilibrium which is determined in a new way, usually implying higher prof its than under
perf ect competition, or (3) theories which require a new concept of equilibrium, perhaps along the
lines of Young.
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While Dobb’s analysis employs both static and dynamic elements, the direction here is
usef ul, in part because it is written to f urther the analysis begun by Knight, in part because it
raises the specif ic questions of delaying the elimination of prof its in theoretical analysis. Since
Schumpeter’s early analysis has much in common with Knight’s, his own concepts will nee d to
change in response to Dobb.

49

5. The Dynamic Model of Schumpeter
Schumpeter shif ts f rom advocating mathematical approaches in the early 1930s to
advocating economic history in the 1940s, shocking past students like Paul Samuelson. It is also
in this later period, af ter studying the details of business cycles in depth, t hat the concept of
regulative strategy to conserve a stream of prof its in the f ace of creative destruction becomes part
of his competitive analysis.
Schumpeter's advocacy of history is not surprising given his starting point in The Theory
of Economic Development which, as he wrote in the pref ace to the Japanese translation, was “to
construct a theoretical model of the process of economic change in time” or to “answer the
question of how the economic system generates the f orce which incessantly transf orms i t.”112 He
notes that this intention, although not the result, is similar to Marx. The story goes that between
his early work and his later work Schumpeter was more optimistic about the possibilities of
equilibrium and mathematical approaches. Clearly, howev er, his f eelings were already moving
away f rom them in the mid-1930s, as in his review of Joan Robinson’s work on imperf ect
competition where he writes “the time has probably come to get rid of the apparatus of supply and
demand.”113
Not only was it time to get rid of supply and demand and embrace a dynamic theory but
economic history is, Schumpeter writes in the introduction of History of Economic Analysis, “by f ar
the most important” f undamental f ield of economics and that “most of the f undamental errors
currently committed in economic analysis are due to lack of historical experience.” 114 In one of the
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last essays, he laments the lack of cooperation between economists and historians in what
amounts to a plea f or f urther research. 115 Indeed, it is only in 1954, with Charles Wilson’s three
volume The History of Unilever, when business history is established as a serious subject of
intellectual interest. Alf red Chandler’s f irst work, Strategy and Structure, was only published in
1962. One of Schumpeter’s biographers has written that a competent editor could have turned
Schumpeter’s Business Cycles into the f irst academic work on business history —but it was not to
be. 116 In the year bef ore his death, Schumpeter’s relationship with history is clear when he writes
that he believes “there is an incessant give and take between historical and theoretical analysis,
though f or investigation of individual questions it may be necessary to sail f or a time on one tack
only.”117
The theory of competition presented in Schumpeter’s later work was developed in such a
way as to successf ully encounter the f acts of history by being robust enough to deal with their
bewildering variety. Schumpeter was made aware of this rich complexity as he worked through
the historical research which culminated in his Business Cycles. Few would see this work as a
success but the historical research which went into it can be seen as setting the f actual and
historical constraints that a theory of monopolis tic competition must encounter. This theory of
competition, in the sense of a theory of competition which regulates the f orces of capitalism, is
f ound in his most acclaimed work, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.

5.1 Competition in Theory of Economic Development
His later model of competition solves a problem shared with Knight and identif ied by
Dobb, namely, that his f irst theory is a short run theory. In The Theory of Economic Development
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changes are brought about by entrepreneurs combining f actors int o new and novel—hitherto
unseen—arrangements. This is the entire def inition of “innovation” and all f urther discussion
evolves out of that problems which arise f rom embarking on a new and untried path. 118 Clearly,
innovation applies to a new product, a new variant of product, a new method of production, a new
market, a new input, or a new method of organization. 119 The theory is that economic activity is
set in motion by an entrepreneur making innovative investments —f unded in his f irst theory and in
Business Cycles by bank credit —and the overall system is one of endogenous qualitative growth
where any equilibriums that might exist are displaced in a discontinuous manner. The
discontinuity, f or Schumpeter, is a def ining f eature of a dynamic theory (in Schumpeter’s
language, a “theory of development”) as compared with a static theory.
In his early work, new combinations “as a rule” are f rom new f irms and those carrying out
combinations are “entrepreneurs,” separated f rom the “capitalist” who f und the enterprise and
who risk their capital. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur must show leadership in the f ace of a lack of
data—i.e., uncertainty —regarding the f uture about which he can only guess. 120 The success of the
enterprise depends upon “intuition, the capacity of seeing t hings in a way which af terward proves
to be true.”121 In this way the entrepreneur leads “the means of production into new channels,”
presumably shaping consumer budgets, undermining older f irms. Clearly, we have Schumpeter’s
entrepreneur encountering f undamental uncertainty 10 years bef ore Knight’s thesis.
The problems with this analysis, prior to Schumpeter’s later modif ication, is that it doesn’t
address the competitive process except by bringing out the development of new and innovating
enterprises—or, with Knight’s style of emphasis, except by showing the importance of better
anticipations in the f ace of uncertainty. The approach doesn’t deal very well, f or instance, with
what we might call the competitive response of existing f irms to the new enterpris e. The concept
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of innovation, as well, carries too great weight in the model and the theory of prof its is essentially
only a short run theory of prof its from successful innovations. A continuity of profits would only
arise f rom a continuous stream of successf ul innovations. The similarities with Knight are clear
with the caveat that Schumpeter is already discussing business planning, whereas Knight is
overwhelmingly f ocused on the uncertainty of specif ic decisions and the resulting or required
structures. 122 Both, however, are short run explanations.
It is worth noting here that it is artif icial to remove Schumpeter’s early concept of
competition f rom his theory of cycles, since cycles can be seen as being driven by a swarm of
entrepreneurs whose expectations are later upset. These entrepreneurs drive instability in the
economic system by creating systems of increasing returns, undermining old establishments,
collectively over investing and thereaf ter causing a cluster of errors. It is also necessary here to
remain f ocused on micro elements and to exclude a discussion of aggregates. Minsky has noted
that prof its f rom competition in Schumpeter are in part driven by a cycle in aggregates, such as
total credit, and that the Kaleckian prof it-investment accounting identity is latent in Schumpeter's
work. 123 Our f ocus here will be on the process of competition at the f irm level.

5.2 Competition in Business Cycles
While the systematic analysis of the middle and long period of the competitive process is
developed in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, certain aspects were beginning to f orm in
Schumpeter’s Business Cycles. Here prof it is a “f unctional return” since it is a temporary, not a
recurring, income. What is most important in the analysis are “the struggles to conserve the
stream of prof it itself.”124 He writes:
“Secrecy regarding processes, patents, judicious dif ferentiation of products, advertising,
and the like, occasionally also aggression directed against actual and would -be
competitors, are instances of a f amiliar strategy, which in the public, as well as in the
prof essional, mind have done much to veil the so urce and nature of prof its in our sense,
especially because that strategy may be resorted to in other cases as well.”
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Writing in the wake of Robinson and Chamberlin, one sees Schumpeter ref erring to business
strategy, not so much as a separate component o f his analysis, but rather a latent aspect of
reality —the ”judicious dif f erentiation of products, advertising,” he notes, “are instances of a
f amiliar strategy.” Still, he is saying that these f eatures “veil the source and nature of prof its” in his
sense. What sense does Schumpeter mean?
“It f ollows that prof its might, as f ar as this goes, be also included in the category of
monopoloid gains. This, however, would blur the specif ic character in our case: not every
generalization is prof itable to an analyst —anymore than every innovation is to an
innovator. Moreover, prof its change their character in the course of such struggles.
Not only is practically every enterprise threatened and put on the def ensive as
soon as it comes into existence, but it also threatens the existing structure of
industry…An innovation sometimes may do so by its mere possibility and even bef ore it
is embodied in an enterprise. That structure...resents the threat and perceives
possibilities of defence other than adaptation by a competitiv e struggle which generally
means death f or many of its units...Taking industry as a whole, there is always an
innovating sphere waring with an “old” sphere, which sometimes tries to secure
prohibition of the new ways of doing things...or to discredit them. ..or to buy them of f ...or
penalize them.”125
Despite the resistance of the “old'' sphere, a paradox is that the competition f orces the resistant
old sphere to evolve and adopt new methods by the “law of its own lif e.” The prof its which arise
through this process are, it would seem, more tentative than the mere prof its from innovation
f ound in Theory of Economic Development. They arise f rom innovating f irms which are able to
persevere through the competitive struggle as old f irms go to war and seek to protec t their market
positions by strategies of defense or by adopting similar innovations. He notes that “prof its
change their character in the course of such struggles” which we take to mean that prof its f rom
successf ul innovations are, in time, transf ormed into situations of “imperf ect competition” with
“monopoloid gains,” although this only happens af ter a war over the structure of the industry.
It is also evident that Knightian “anticipations” in the context of unequal skill are part and
parcel of innovation, f or instance, as in the f irst page of his chapter in Business Cycles called
“The Contours of Economic Evolution.”126 There he makes it clear that innovation merely sets in
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motion the competitive struggle as it engages the old spheres, as well as creating imitating
competitors along the “path of innovation.”127
The f ocus of this work was on business cycles and he was not trying to develop or
elaborate a theory of competition, such as might play the role that the theory of competition has
traditionally played in economic theory. Neither his sociologist biographer, Richard Swedberg, nor
his business historian biographer, Thomas McCraw, realize this theoretical intention or how
Schumpeter’s questions and perspectives grow out of the existing literature. While Business
Cycles was written during the great depression, Schumpeter’s actual analysis of the great
depression—that it was due to allowing bank f ailures en masse—was absent f rom the text. 128 The
argument f or a new theoretical approach to competition, so it may serve its traditional role in
economic theory, was saved f or Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.

5.3 Competition in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
The problem of medium and long term prof its —in the f ace of , as we will see, creative
destruction—becomes the f ocus of the analysis in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. The
problems f or entrepreneurs and managers created by a world of innovation —essentially the
f undamental uncertainty f rom rapid economic change f acing investment —raises the problem that
a business needs to manage this constant change. The economic system can never be stationary
and the impulse which keeps the “capitalist engine in motion comes f rom the new consumers’
goods, new methods of production or transportation, the new markets, the new f orms of industrial
organization that capitalist enterprise creates.” 129 This results in competitive f orces unlike those
assumed in static approaches. One of t quoted passage reads that the competition which counts
is:
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“...the competition f rom the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of
supply, the new type of organization...competition which commands a decisive cost or
quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the prof its and the output of the
existing f irms but at their f oundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is
much more ef f ective than the other as a bombardment is in comparison with f orcing a
door...it disciplines bef ore it attacks.”130
It is to be expected that rational behavior in such an environment is to manage these risks. For
Schumpeter’s, this is done through business or regulative strategy. Business strategy, he writes,
obtains its signif icance in this uncertain and competitive environment: “It must be seen in its role
in the perennial gale of creative destruction: it cannot be understood irrespective of it or, in f act,
on the hypothesis that there is a perennial lull.” This competition is not the sort of competition
which simply “drives out high cost producers” and steadily reduces prof its f rom innovation but
rather competition which entirely threatens product lines, production, and a f irm’s existence. 131
Compared to young Schumpeter, there are two new elements in his competitive analysis
which play f unctional roles: regulative strategy and creative destruction. In mainstream
economics, creative destruction has been received into the textbooks but regulativ e strategy has
not. This is a mistake because of the importance of the concept in a dynamic model of
competition. Indeed, Schumpeter’s History of Economic Analysis itself ref ers to business strategy
a number of times at one point writing that assumptions o f perf ect competition as the general
state of af fairs can be called: “the Principle of Excluded Strategy and accordingly say that the bulk
of ...pure theory...was a pure theory of static equilibrium that excluded strategy” (emphasis
Schumpeter’s). 132
The concept of “regulative strategy” exists to manage “creative destruction” and “creative
destruction” exists, in Schumpeter’s model, to destroy regulative strategies which have thus f ar
protected prof it positions. These two ideas are connected at conception and are def ined in
contrast to each other in terms of their analytic f unction. A f ew economists —like his sociologist
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biographer who suggests his analysis of monopolistic competition may be tongue in cheek —miss
the f act that Schumpeter is attempting to present a new theory of competition which can continue
to serve its traditional role in economic theory, albeit within a realistic dynamic model.

5.3.1 Creative Destruction and Regulative Strategies
For Schumpeter, the f uture is f ull of threats f rom new innovation enabled through the
increasing returns environment which is rapidly changing the calculation of business. “Long range
investing under rapidly changing conditions,” Schumpeter writes, “especially under conditions that
change or may change at any moment under the impact of new commodities and technologies, is
like shooting at a target that is not only indistinct but moving —and moving jerkily at that.”133
Patents, secrecy, long period contracts may help but the problem is more extreme due to other
risks which are “no less an element in long -run costs” and where one is unable to insure against.
In such cases, other means must be devised to protect investment f rom the f undamental
uncertainty of the f uture and those means are “regulative” or business strategy. S chumpeter, it
should be noted, also calls it restrictive strategy, not in the sense of restricting output but of
restricting competition in the Dobbian sense. Schumpeter cites the case of new f irms or new
aggressors f or illustration because these instances allow f or greater illustration. 134 These
aggressors:
“Require, f or purposes of attack and def ense, also pieces of armor other than price and
the quality of their product which, moreover, must be strategically manipulated all
along...largest-scale plans could in many cases not materialize at all if it were not known
f rom the outset that competition will be discouraged by heavy capital requirements or lack
of experience, or that means are available to discourage or checkmate it so as to gain the
time and space f or f urther developments.”135
Schumpeter notes that even one of the most aggressive corporate strategies of all time—the
Standard Oil railroad rebate scheme covered by Ida Tarbell in 1904—can be seen in a dif f erent
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light when the scheme is viewed only f rom the perspective of the total output and ignoring the
moral implications. 136
Many enterprises would not have begun, Schumpeter notes, if they did not believe that
“exceptionally f avorable situations are likely to arise which, if exploited by price, quali ty and
quantity manipulation will produce prof its adequate to tide over exceptionally unf avorable
situations provided these are similarly managed.” 137 The argument includes old and established
f irms in that they have to develop strategies to manage change, inclusive of moments when
obsolete industries attempt to “turn a rout...into orderly retreat.” 138 All of this, he writes, is “the
tristest common sense” which is “overlooked with a persistence so stubborn as to raise the
question of sincerity.”139 The debates on the empirical f act of price rigidity miss the point and may
be better understood as attempts by industry to avoid the chaos of always adapting prices to the
environment by f ollowing a pricing policy and strategy to even out these ef f ects, thereby help ing
to stabilize their markets.
The terminology of “monopoly” is, as well, problematic f or Schumpeter given its historical
development in the classics and, eventually, in Cournot and Marshall. Firms which appear to
have the most monopolistic elements—like railroads and power utilities—had to “create the
demand f or their services and, when they had done so, to def end their markets against
competition.”140 In the f irst conception of monopolies, like the Tudor and Stuart monopolies
criticized by Adam Smith, the monopoly price is higher and the output smaller than the
competitive price and output. In the modern conception, however, “there are superior methods
136
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available to the monopolist” which their competitors either cannot access at all or only slowly, with
Schumpeter noting that the monopoly may attract abler employees and have better f inancial
standing, with the result that “monopoly prices are not necessarily higher or monopoly outputs
smaller” than under the competitive hypothesis.
The monopolistic competition analysis outside of the static schema results in an entirely
dif f erent conclusion than that understood by Cournot and Marshall because they arise in the
context of creative destruction—innovation, increasing returns, f undamental uncertainty —and
since they “largely create what they exploit.”141 The history of US railroads in the west are the
striking example of this process of circular and cumulative causation. One acclaimed business
history, Overton’s Burlington Route, writes that the dilemma of the American west was that
“without a substantial population in its territory willing and able to ship and travel, no railroad
could survive as a venture, but only a railroad could bring about a rapid development of the
area.”142
Furthermore, the typical conclusion that long run output is below competitive conditions is
only applicable in a static model. If an innovation allows f or a temporary monopoly on a product,
there are still some substitutes and the demand schedule f or the new product needs to be built up
overtime. The element of “monopoly gain in those entrepreneurial prof its which are the prizes
of f ered by capitalist society to the successf ul innovator” have their main f unction in that it gives
“space...f or long-range planning” which is back where we started with business strategy. 143 Not all
f irms successf ully make the transition f rom innovation to long term planning —f or instance, Ford
Motor in its early contests with General Motors. To illustrate the importance of strategy in a
realistic dynamic theory of monopolistic competition, we discuss two examples f rom business
history in section 5.4 below.
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5.3.2 Schumpeter Responds to Critics
Schumpeter closes his discussion of monopolistic competition by pointing out that static
models of imperf ect competition preclude progress, entail wastes of their own, and moreover are
all impossible on their own terms. Business strategy, f requently resulting in the development of
large-scale establishments, is f or Schumpeter the most powerf ul engine of progress in terms of
the expansion of long range output.
In the pref ace to the second edition of Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy published
1946, Schumpeter reacts to the “what many readers considered to be a def ense
of monopolistic practice.”144 He writes that he is only describing the history and theoretical
situation of monopolistic competition which “no competent economist can deny.” He writes:
“1. The classical theory of monopolistic pricing (the Cournot -Marshall theory) is
not entirely valueless, especially when overhauled so as to deal not only with the
instantaneous maximization of monopoly gain but also with maximization over time. But it
works with assumptions that are so restrictive as to exclude its direct application to
reality. In particular it cannot be used f or what it is being used in current teaching,
namely, f or a comparison between the way in which a purely competitive economy
f unctions and the way in which an economy f unctions that contains substantial elements
of monopoly.
The main reason f or this is that the theory assumes given demand and cost
conditions, the same f or the competitive and the monopolistic case, whereas it is of the
essence of modern big business that its demand and cost conditions are, f or large
quantities of output, much more f avorable—and inevitably so—than the demand and cost
conditions that would exist in the same industries in a régime of perf ect competition.
2. Current economic theory is almost wholly a theory of the administration of a
given industrial apparatus. But much more important than the manner in which capitalism
administers given industrial structures is the manner in which it creates them...into this
process of creation the monopoly element enters necessarily.” 145

The manner in which capitalism creates industrial structures is through prof itable innovations
which allow f or the application of regulative strategy. These strategies inherently have “monopoly
elements” and result in imperf ectly competitive market structures at any given moment in time.
This monopolistic competition is, however, general in that all f irms are seeking to establish
attractive demand and cost conditions with their strategy; or, in other words, all f irms are seeking
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prof its in a dynamic environment with uncertainty and creative destruction. The strategies whose
outcome is an attractive demand and cost condition are those which are successf ul in managing
the rapidly changing environment or, in other words, those who successf ully manage the
uncertainty created by creative destruction.

5.3.3 Competition in History of Economic Analysis
“Forward strategy very of ten requires def ensive tactics as a complement,” Schum peter
writes early on his History of Economic Analysis bef ore complaining that economists are stubborn
in their ref usal to discuss business strategy.146 In his last great work, some of the lineage drawn
up in this essay can be seen. For instance, when discussing entrepreneurial gains Schumpeter
writes:
“The f undamental reason is that entrepreneurial gains are not permanent returns at all
but emerge each time—to adopt the language of the Knight-Dobb theory—an
entrepreneur’s decision in conditions of uncertainty proves successf ul and have no
def inite relation to the size of the capital employed.” 147
And that:
“In the second place, it should be observed that, whatever their nature in other respects,
entrepreneurs’ gains will practically always bear some relation to monopolistic pricing.
Whatever it is that produces these gains, it must of necessity be something that, f or the
moment at least, competitors cannot parallel f or, if they did, no surplus over costs
(including entrepreneurial ‘wages’) could emerge. The successf ul introduction of a new
commodity or brand is perhaps the best illustration of this. Moreover, there are means
available to the successf ul entrepreneur—patents, ‘strategy,’ and so on—f or prolonging
the lif e of his monopolistic or quasi-monopolistic position and f or rendering it more dif ficult
f or competitors to close up on him.”148
Schumpeter f ollows these notes by saying that this has much in common with a “depredation
theory” (i.e., exploitation) of profits and that interpretation seems to be a matter of ideology:
“Obviously, this may be linked up with the elements of the case that have been glanced
at in the preceding paragraph in such a way as to yield a picture of reality that may, f or
practical purposes, dif fer but little f rom that drawn b y a straight depredation theory. Rare
birds indeed are the economists who give the proper weight to this set of f acts and at the
same time do not overstress them. It is here rather than in the f undamental question of
146

Schumpeter, History, p. 146.

147

Ibid., p. 864.

148

Ibid.
61

theory involved that ideological bias as well as political interest assert themselves. On
principle, a sponsor of a f unctional theory is at liberty to give as much weight to predatory
activities as he pleases. But most economists who wrote bef ore 1914 may have
underutilized this f reedom as much as many of their successors have abused it. It must
not be f orgotten, however, that the widespread hostility to big business and to ‘trusts,’ so
f ar as there was any analytic meaning to it, does imply equally widespread recognition of
the f acts ref erred to.”149
The observation here regarding ideology leads the way into many important problems f acing the
method of economics. While these are beyond the scope of this essay, one relevant instance of
these ideological problems can be mentioned here. In Frank Knight’s pref ace to the 1957 edition
of Risk, Uncertainty, and Profits he explains that economic “truth” is pitted against “combating
prejudice” and that Knight thinks it more usef ul to side with the latter because this makes
“economics more usef ul to society” and f orces economists to sell their line. 150 In this pref ace, he
is advising economists not to dissent f rom orthodoxy as he himself had done. The implication is
that he views his theory of “actual prof its” and imperf ect competition arising f rom uncertainty to b e
“truth” while viewing the concept of perf ect competition as a means of “combating prejudice.”

5.4 Historical Examples
Af ter the above discussion, with its f ocus on how actual competition works in a dynamic
model with uncertainty, we appeal to the historical record to demonstrate the overwhelming
importance that regulative strategy can have on actual historical outcomes. F irst, we will review
how Ford Motor did not parlay its initial prof its f rom innovation into a long term strategy which
would protect the f irm's market position. Ford Motor eventually lost its lead to General Motors
who f ollowed a distinctly dif ferent strategy. Af terward, we will review how the mail order f irms
encountered the changing market brought on by the development of the automobile. The result
was a need to change strategies. The crucial point in each case is the determining f actor of
regulative strategy as compared to price, product or advertising competition.
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5.4.1 Ford versus General Motors: 1908 - 1929 (Example 1)
Schumpeter wrote in Business Cycles that the automobile industry qualif ies “f or the role
of standard example f or the process embodied in our model [of economic change].”151 And that it
“did not simply expand in f unction of the increase in real income but helped to bring it about.” 152
General Motors, despite its bankruptcy in 2009, was the 12th greatest wealth creating
f irm between 1926 and 2017 due to its long history of dividends and above market returns in the
middle of the 20th century. It also went through one of the most well known strategic contests
with Ford Motor which can be used to illustrate aspects of economic reality which Sc humpeter’s
theory of competition attempts to capture. The strategic contest can be described as f ollows.
Ford’s assembly line innovation gave it a huge position, about half the market in 1914,
with commensurate prof its. By the mid -1920s, it ranked f irst in payments f or wages and supplies
in the United States. It achieved this by f ocusing on the low end of the market with the Model T,
thereby expanding the market. From the start, Ford Motor was concentrated on a single product
and maximizing the economies of scale f rom this single product.
General Motors, a collection of consolidated small volume automobile manuf acturers
backed by Du Pont, saw that its best strategy—the strategy which best managed the long term
uncertainty of investment—was to build automobiles in volume at dif f erent price points, in part
because of their sunk costs in numerous acquired divisions pointed in this direction, in part
because of the advancing income of the US consumer would allow f or greater long term product
dif f erentiation. This was particularly important as the market was evolving to one where
consumers purchased a replacement automobile, rather than their f irst automobile. Industrial
capacity came to outstrip demand and Chandler writes, “Marketing became a greater problem
than production” and that “Henry Ford ref used to take seriously these f undamental changes in the
market.”153 General Motors was transparent about its strategy, f or instance disclosing it in detail in
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their 1923 annual report. Ford could have imitated it but rather choose to f ollow their largely
single product strategy.
Over the course of the 1920s it was to become clear that GM’s strategy was superior and
Ford was f orced to change strategies in imitation in the late 1920s. The def eat of Ford was all the
more striking because they had to entirely stop production. The predominant f actor in determining
the competitive outcome of this inter-industry competitive struggle was having the right strategy to
manage the uncertainty of investment in the f ace of the rapidly changing environment.
To illustrate the importance of this point, consider that Henry Ford’s technically superior
River Rouge plant embodied the mistake of his strategy, despite its superiority in output. Its large
f ixed costs were geared to the low cost production of a single, increasingly outdated, product: the
Ford Model T with its production run of 18 years. These high f ixed costs reduced f lexibility in the
f ace of a rapidly changing market and dismissed the lessons of General Motors strategy of “a car
f or every purse and purpose.”154
General Motors’ dealer strategy f urther illustrates the wisdom of their overall policies,
while also illustrating the complex character of regulative strategy more generally. General Motors
allowed dealers a greater markup on new vehicles than Ford—making it more attractive to sell
General Motors vehicles—while providing them with back of f ice services and f inancing.
Furthermore, General Motors did not interf ere with dealer pricing f or used vehicles. Ford, by
contrast, limited markups on used vehicles, only allowed a smaller markup on new vehicles and
did not assist dealers with the back of fice or provide f inancing. Clearly, it was more attractive to
be a dealer f or General Motors and this was an explicit strategy of the f irm .
Strategic dif f erentiation between the two f irms can also be seen in their attitude towards
vertical integration. General Motors, f or purposes of “insurance,” had a strategic policy of 100%
control of 33% of their parts and accessory suppliers. That is, they only partially vertically
integrated as a matter of strategy. Ford Motor, by contrast, was as vertically integrated as
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possible. Chandler has written that “by using dif f ering strategies of vertical integration both
General Motors and Chrysler paid a smaller price than Ford f or operating at reduced capacity.” 155
Alf red Sloan, president of GM and architect of their strategy, wrote that:
“Every enterprise needs a concept of its industry. There is a logical way of doing
business in accordance with the f acts and circumstances of an industry, if you can f igure
it out. If there are dif ferent concepts among the enterprises involved, these concepts are
likely to express competitive f orces in their most vigorous and most decisive f orm.” 156

Clearly, Ford’s strategy was to of f er one primary product and to maximize the cost
advantages of large scale production with signif icant vertical integration. He was known f or saying
that customers can have “any color that he wants so long as it is black.” This f ocus missed t he
power of General Motors’ strategy, which began in the mid -1920s to better meet the needs of
their changing market. The success of General Motors’ strategy was particularly striking in that it
f orced Ford to completely stop production f or several months to retool their River Rouge plant in
1927. Chrysler, simply by imitating General Motors strategy, was able to capture more market
share than Ford by the late 1930s.

5.4.2 Sears and the Development of Department Stores (Example 2)
The rapid changes in the market brought about by the automobile f orced the great mail
order f irms to change strategy. This can be seen in the story of Sears Roebuck transition f rom a
mail order f irm into a retailer. At the start of their business, Sears was an imitator of Montgomery
Ward and only sold watches and jewelry by mail order. Montgomery Ward had discovered the
potential demand in the countryside by selling goods and having them delivered to railroad
terminals f or pick up. Sears, Roebuck and Company in 1895 expanded their merchandise into the
goods wanted in the American countryside and, overtime, had suf f icient success in
merchandising to surpass Montgomery Ward in sales. 157 Both f irms quickly made investments in
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distribution f acilities that had volume and lines of business that greatly exceeded the largest chain
and department stores. Using the language of Schumpeter, the success of these two f irm’s gave
them room f or long range planning which was, in this case, put to good use. By the end of 1970,
af ter successf ully adopting a new strategy in the 1930s, Sears was the 6th most wealth creating
f irm since 1926 behind only General Motors, IBM, Standard oil of New Jersey (not yet renamed
Exxon), AT&T and DuPont.
The importance of regulative strategy as an element in the theory of competition can be
highlighted by the changes which took place with the increasing presence of the automobile. The
economics of rural mail order shipment rested, in part, on the dif f iculty of rural America getting to
a market where they could purchase goods. An executive of Montgomery Ward and f ormer U.S.
brigadier general, Robert Wood, noticed f rom the Statistical Abstract Of The United States that
the United States was rapidly urbanizing. Robert Wood, af tering trying to sound the alarm at
Montgomery Ward, joined Sears on the understanding that he would be able to develop a
strategy to encounter the changes in the market, namely, the introduction of retai l stores to
distribute durable goods at high volumes in urbanizing areas.
The changing market required a change in strategy to manage the uncertainty which was
being created by this change. The outcome of this struggle was not determined by shif ting
advertising dollars, adjusting the product, or of f ering the best price. It was determined through
having the best strategy to manage long term uncertainty driven by rapid economic change.
Despite being new to the f ield of retailing and claiming to have made every mistake possible in
the f ield, Sears began to have success and Montgomery Ward belatedly began to imitate
successf ully. Sears shif ted f ull gear into their retailing strategy when Robert Wood came to head
Sears in 1928.
Wood later says in 1948, “Business is like war in one respect—if its grand strategy is
correct, any number of tactical errors can be made yet the enterprise proves successf ul.” 158 His
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retailing strategy was to concentrate on growing urban markets, with a mix of dif ferent store sizes,
targeting population areas above a certain threshold to avoid competing with their rural mail order
business. The point was, naturally, to leverage their past mail order investments and to avoid
cutting into their existing mail order business.
The dif ferent store sizes were positioned to compete against the other retail stores of the
era who did not have the same buying power in durable goods as a mail order house. Taking into
account the revolution of the automobile, f urthermore, meant a spread of retailing centers to new
points and Sears located many of its stores away f rom expensive city centers to cheap land
accessible f rom highways.
To manage the uncertainty of their supply, Sears’ strategy was to buy an interest in
f actories which made goods where the sup ply was most uncertain. The f irm restricted its
ownership to 50% or less and pref erred that the f actory continued to sell some of its output to
other f irms. From a unit cost perspective, their strategy was essentially to link up volume buying
power with mass production and mass distribution and take advantage of their scale. 159 Overtime,
the f irm would come to design their own products f or reasons of , quoting Chandler, increasing “its
control over the f unction of coordinating the f low of products to include every step f rom the initial
design of the product to its sale to the ultimate customer.” 160
By the early 1930s, the mail order business deteriorated rapidly with revenues f alling
f rom $266 million in 1929 to $116 million in 1932—a 56.3% collapse—due to a f all in f arm
incomes f rom the great depression. Their retail business initially grew between 1929 and 1931
until the depression caught up with them in 1932 at which point their retail business was only
8.6% below 1929, a comparatively good result justif ying their prior shif t in strategy. 161 Their
investment into physical retailing both generated new streams of profits and helped to protect
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their prior investment in handling f acilities. Without making the change the f irm likely could not
have survived the rapidly changing conditions in their market in the early 1930s.
In this example, as in the General Motor’s example, the f irms required a specif ic strategy
to manage the uncertainty of rapid change and the f irms invested based on the quantitative and
qualitative changes they perceived in their market. These investments served to simultaneously
grow f uture prof its and protect their past investments. Their strategies took into account the
complexity of the market conditions and they organized their strategy in such a way so as to
maximize their long term success within those conditions. While the f irms were seeking prof itable
investment outlets, their search f or investment and prof its were in the context of a general
strategy which was designed to manage the rapidly changing conditions, placing the f irm in the
best position possible f or what were perceived as f uture conditions based on inf ormation
available at the time.
Especially in the case of Sears is it clear that their business required a new strategy
given the subsequent f all of f in their mail order business. In this context, it is clear that these f irms
were competing not specif ically on the “product” of marketing and distribution or on price or on
advertising driven loyalty but on another level of organizational concepts —“grand strategy”—
which had to play out over long range periods of time. Had the f irm not changed strategies and
chosen the right one, the f irm would have been creatively destroyed.
The theoretical point of these examples is to emphasize the theoretical critique of
marginalism in Schumpeter—that mere price, product and advertising competition is insuf f icient
to explain capitalist competition—and to illustrate his theory of regulative strategies to manage
the creatively destructive environment. It is not enough to say f irms prof it maximize or to describe
competition in terms of price, product or advertising. In a realistic dynamic system with increasing
returns and uncertainty f irms must plan on the basis of a concept of their market —or rather of
their f uture market—and then f ollow a strategy to regulate the uncertainty of their invest ment in
accordance with this point of view.
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Firms are necessarily seeking prof its and growth but the complexion of competition arises
through competing strategies to manage uncertainty of past and f orward looking investment.
Theories of competition which consider only price or product competition are, in that sense,
inadequate to the tasks of explaining the regulative f unction of competition between dif f erent f irms
or units capital.
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6. Conclusion: Schumpeter and Bessembinder
The results f irst identif ied by Bessembinder indicates that there is an extreme skew in
corporate wealth creation, suggesting the continuous existence of large market share winners
with prices suf f iciently above costs to allow f or large accounting prof its or, at least, the long term
promise of prof its. Across the entire data set it is also clear that many f irms become large wealth
creators f or decades bef ore losing their position overtime. A f ew f irms are important corporate
wealth creators f or the entire 9 decades of the dataset.
The continuous persistence of exceptional f irms over many decades determine average
f inancial returns by dramatically skewing the distribution. The typical increase in U.S. public
corporate wealth resides within these f irms. These f irms are critical f actors in determining other
“average” relationships throughout the economy, like price, quality and distribution. Furthermore,
these average returns enter into the state of long -term expectations which, in Keynes, eventually
impacts the aggregate level of investment. 162
Our interest was in the realistic theories of competition which could best describe this
historical outcome. A survey of realistic static equilibrium theories showed that they stopped at
the door of the most important theoretical questions because they could not explain important
aspects of realistic f irm behavior, most notably increasing returns. Many of these theories also
assume long run “normal” prof its, an assumption which f lies in the f ace of Bessembinder’s
results.
This f ailure of static theory drove the search into dynamic theory, with its f ocus on change
and actual outcomes. The period of dynamic theory we examined began with Schumpeter’s 1911
book, The Theory of Economic Development, which helped inspire the theoretical f oundatio ns of
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Knight’s 1921 book, Risk, Uncertainty and Profits. Dobb responds to both of them in 1925 with
Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress which, though perhaps “jejune,” raised a critical
theoretical problem about their theories: they did not describe the long term maintenance of prof it
positions which were evident to Dobb. Here we f ind a f ocus on how the response of competition
is slowed or stopped to allow f or prof its to be maintained and capitalized. But even here, Dobb
neglects how the things he discusses are overcome by competition, only mentioning that
uncertainty f rom economic change means signif icant losses at irregular intervals which, in the
progress of civilization, are assumed to be counterbalanced by the gains. We argue that only late
Schumpeter deals with the whole problem by describing the creation of prof it positions, their
maintenance, and their competitive destruction. The skew in corporate wealth creation can only
be explained by a theory which can account f or the whole lif e cycle of f irms, as Schumpeter’s
theory does. Static equilibrium theories where all the f irms have the same cost structure,
annihilating any competitive advantages f rom increasing returns, cannot be used to explain the
skew in corporate wealth creation.
Frank Knight’s theory of prof it and imperf ect markets f rom uncertainty may explain
temporary large prof it positions and why concentrated markets can exist but it does not explain
why these prof it positions are sometimes protected f rom competition. Schumpeter’s f irst theory of
innovation had the same problem writing “competitors...first reduce and then annihilate [the
entrepreneurs] prof it.”163 But we know that many of these competitive positions generate a
disproportionate amount of wealth f or decades and theref ore these early theories of Schumpeter
and Knight are insuf f icient to explain the long term skew in wealth creation. Dobb helps to f rame
the problem as rather related to the slowing or prevention of new supply f rom competitors.
Schumpeter views Dobb’s Capitalist Enterprise and Social Progress as clearly positioning Dobb
as a capitalist in terms of his economics, regardless of his politics. 164
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With the introduction of “regulative strategies” Schumpeter presents his own concept of
the persistence of prof it positions and introduces one of the most f amous terms to show how
these prof it positions are dismantled: creative destruction. Thus, Schumpeter makes the case f or
a realistic theory of prof it positions, imperf ect markets, the slowing or prevention of new
competitors, with their eventual decline—all of which is implied by our survey of the historic skew
in corporate wealth creation. This skew in corporate wealth creation is a result of competitive
struggles with big winners in monopolistically competitive markets who t hen protect their market
positions with business strategy, sometimes f or decades. Strategy is crucial f or Schumpeter as
mere product, price, or trademark superiority are seen as insuf f icient to describe historical
outcomes.
Knight wrote in 1921 that actual prof its are a residual—they are what is lef t over af ter
everything else has been determined in the context of uncertainty. In this sense, prof its need not
have some specif ic relationship with the capital employed —this is also Schumpeter’s position and
it is what appears to be born out by the diverge rates of the growth of wealth uncovered by an
investigation in long term f inancial returns. 165 Dobb notes that Cantillon def ined the entrepreneur
as “one who bought goods ‘at a f ixed price’ and sold them ‘at an uncertain price.’” 166 There is
uncertainty in sales, whereas costs are more predictable and determined. If an entrepreneur has
better anticipated the f uture, they can prof it to the extent that the market will “bear the traf f i c.” A
f irm can invest where it anticipates having a high likelihood of success and where the investments
are protective of past and ongoing investments. The protective nature of investments are part of a
“regulating strategy” whose goal is to make the f uture more predictable and manageable, even if
probabilities can only be a Knightian “estimate of an estimate.”
The anticipations that really pay of f are those which are innovative and introduce new
things into the ongoing f low of the economic system, since new things are not immediately
copyable without dif f iculty. These innovations and anticipations generate receipts and short run
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prof its which give room f or long term strategy bef ore competitors, to quote Schumpeter, f ollow
“af ter them...in increasing numbers, in the path of innovation, which becomes progressively
smoothed f or successors by accumulating experience and vanishing obstacles.” 167
Firms f ollow a strategy to build up aspects of their business which competitors may not
f ind possible to replicate—like their trade-mark, supplier relationships, technical innovations,
product design, and good will—all while envisioning a plan which will best insulate them f rom the
best ef f orts of their competitors. The plan or strategy is designed to slow, or entirely eliminate, a
competitor’s ability to parallel what the innovative f irm has done. In no sense does this imply the
restriction of output and in many cases it means the opposite, since the latter prevents a
competitor’s ability to parallel a f irm seeking to ex tend an existing cost advantage through scale.
It is illustrative to note that, because of this phenomenon, the risk f aced by an entrepreneur may
not be simply upward sloping with capital invested, as in Kalecki’s principle of increasing risk, but
may initially drop as increasing investment initially lowers risks by preventing ef f ective
competition.
Firms cultivate a strategy based on what they believe will reduce the uninsurable
uncertain risks to their prof it streams. This is not the f orecastable variance of returns as in Steindl
but a risk to capital of another order. 168 All these decisions are based on the nature of their
specif ic and varied markets—such as the degree of capital intensity allowed f or in production,
giving room f or economies of scale, or the degree to which consumer demand can be ensured
through building goodwill via advertising or service levels —with the implication that it would be
dif f icult to generalize f rom any one competitive struggle. If the innovating f irm is successf ul and
continues to grow and scale, eventually the competitors will recede, f ail, and the market will look
oligopolic. There will be advantages in size, either through the scale of the plant, or the scaling on
f ixed administrative and selling expenses —as in Chandler’s “scope”—or in the advantage derived
f rom being able to tap into accumulated goodwill, as noted by Dobb.
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A successf ul strategy leads to the greater application of existing advantages, leading to
more concentrated markets. This theory of market concentration does not disagree with Steindl’s
multiple theories of concentration f rom diversity, where his f avored f irms grow f aster than
disadvantaged f irms due to simple advantages, even when the latter are arrived at through
random processes. 169
Prof its may be reaped as the f irm achieves economies of scale, f urther buttressing itself
against the environment. The static theories of competition cannot manage increasing returns, let
alone uncertainty, or the sheer variety of markets each which demand that a f irm has, quoting
Alf red Sloan, “a concept of its industry.” Alf red Sloan, manager of General Motors while it was the
greatest wealth creating f irm in the world, wrote that “there is a logical way of doing business in
accordance with the f acts and circumstances of an industry” and “if there are dif f erent concepts
among the enterprises involved, these concepts are likely to express competitive f orces in their
most vigorous and most decisive f orm.”170 If the end market is large enough, successf ul f irms will
begin to show up at the top of a list of wealth creation, at least until the environment changes
threatening their prof it positions as their existing strategy is undermined by change. Eventually,
they will be f orced to adapt by “the law of their own lif e” but, as history shows, many will be
unable to do so. 171
The implications of Schumpeter’s analysis is that there will be big winners in markets
because of the cumulative nature of advantages developed through strategy, making it dif f icult for
competitors f ollowing a inf erior strategy or even f or competitors who f ollow the superior strategy
too late f or it to make any dif f erence. The latter implies the existence of f irst mover advantages
which are well documented in the business history literature, as in Alf red Chandler’s Scale and
Scope. In many industries at the turn of the 20th century, there was a huge advantage in scale of
plant and theref ore a common strategy was to scale as rapidly as possible si nce this prevented
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ef f ective competition. Chandler writes, “the latecomers’ [initial] investment not only had to be
larger [to catch up], they were also riskier, precisely because of the f irst movers’ competitive
strength.”172
These winners, however, exist in an industrial landscape which is constantly being
transf ormed through increasing returns present across all industries, allowing f or new divisions of
labor and new innovations. It is a landscape which, at any moment of time, appears to be one of
monopolistic competition with concentrated market share. In time, the increasing returns
environment outside the f irm will alter the superior uncertainty reducing strategy f or the f irms in
the industry, f orcing adaptation or creative destruction.
This analysis suggests that there are big winners and, perhaps, that the precariousness
of these winners depends on the nature of change in their industry or, said another way, the time
in which a strategy, once developed, can remain unchanged without danger. The nature of
change f or that industry depends on the degree of increasing returns available to that industry
and the qualitative change in the external environment. History seems to suggest that some
industries, like cigarettes or chewing gum, are protected f rom change since the increasing returns
available in production and distribution are limited. But even here, contemporary readers will note
the progress of “e-cigarettes” introducing a qualitatively new element into the otherwise “resistant
to change” cigarette market. In other industries, like semiconductor manuf acturers, there is
constant evolution as every part of their business and the entire environment outside of their
business is undergoing rapid change f rom increasing returns.
The key dif f erence between Schumpeter’s theory and the other static or dynamic theories
bef ore him can be illustrated in the f ollowing way. If two f irms were the same in every respect at
an initial point in time—equal amounts of employee talent, f inancial capital, advantages of
location and equal plant, etc.—the f irm f ollowing a superior uncertainty reducing strategy will
rapidly accumulate f urther advantages. The cumulative ef f ect of these advantages result in
greater market share. The f irm f ollowing the more successf ul strategy will, f urthermore, very likely
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have more resources to invest into adjacent markets, if they see this as a means of lowering their
total uncertainty. Following Knight, if the f irm believes they can move into a new market with
some certainty of success, and which does not decrease their chances of continued success in
their “old” market, a more general strategy of diversif ying all their investment nearly compels the
f irm to grow adjacently, if only to scale their f ixed costs of administration, sales and distribu tion.
Or, put another way, a rational policy of reducing the uncertainty of investment always compels
investment and growth if it reduces the long term uncertainty of existing investments. It is not
merely investment f or accumulation but also investment to protect investment. The f irm f ollowing
the inf erior strategy, despite beginning in the same position as the other f irm, will quickly be at a
disadvantage. Depending on the nature of their industry, this may be decisive or merely a
setback. All this, to quote Schumpeter, is “the tristest common sense” which is “overlooked with a
persistence so stubborn as to raise the question of sincerity.” 173

173

Ibid., p. 91. Schumpeter repeats this accusation in History, p. 146.
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Appendix
Top Wealth Creator In Each Ten Year Period

Date

Sample
Size

Percent by Top
By Top 25
Firm
By Top 5 Firms Firms

Top Firm

1926-01-01

493 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

21.22%

67.43%

86.19%

1927-01-01

521 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

13.91%

61.84%

80.14%

1928-01-01

565 AT&T INC

18.26%

71.19%

90.20%

1929-01-01

572 AT&T INC

15.33%

61.49%

83.37%

1930-01-01

580 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

18.52%

61.68%

80.79%

1931-01-01

597 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

12.50%

54.75%

72.78%

1932-01-01

614 SHELL OIL CO

10.54%

50.54%

70.30%

1933-01-01

620 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

11.70%

49.10%

67.77%

1934-01-01

623 AT&T INC

12.87%

50.50%

66.74%

1935-01-01

645 AT&T INC

12.10%

47.17%

63.35%

1936-01-01

672 AT&T INC

9.06%

37.67%

53.45%

1937-01-01

713 AT&T INC

9.44%

35.01%

51.94%

1938-01-01

741 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

8.44%

36.44%

52.37%

1939-01-01

766 CHRYSLER CORP

10.95%

57.36%

72.33%

1940-01-01

788 COCA COLA CO

9.85%

50.46%

66.31%

1941-01-01

818 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

8.45%

37.67%

53.91%

1942-01-01

837 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

8.66%

38.50%

53.12%

1943-01-01

860 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

9.49%

39.19%

53.55%

1944-01-01

872 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

8.85%

40.62%

55.13%

1945-01-01

879 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

9.07%

41.46%

55.79%

1946-01-01

899 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

10.67%

44.89%

59.68%

1947-01-01

920 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

10.17%

43.71%

59.87%

1948-01-01

959 ARCONIC INC

8.35%

47.60%

65.22%

1949-01-01

977 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

7.02%

41.62%

57.82%

1950-01-01

1022 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

6.98%

41.17%

57.14%

1951-01-01

1064 AT&T INC

7.30%

40.76%

56.79%
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1952-01-01

1112 AT&T INC

8.87%

40.28%

54.30%

1953-01-01

2012 AT&T INC

8.52%

43.12%

56.95%

1954-01-01

2116 AT&T INC

8.94%

42.74%

55.46%

1955-01-01

2270 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

9.92%

42.89%

54.08%

1956-01-01

2383 GENERAL MOTORS CORP

8.67%

38.55%

50.25%

1957-01-01

2483 IBM

8.19%

35.93%

49.05%

1958-01-01

2615 IBM

9.70%

33.77%

44.84%

1959-01-01

2755 IBM

9.34%

30.72%

41.12%

1960-01-01

2978 IBM

13.60%

36.34%

49.39%

1961-01-01

3154 IBM

8.27%

40.96%

54.22%

1962-01-01

3337 IBM

6.71%

34.41%

48.16%

1963-01-01

3517 IBM

9.17%

33.53%

49.95%

1964-01-01

7168 IBM

7.11%

31.51%

50.71%

1965-01-01

7171 JOHNSON & JOHNSON

4.07%

31.05%

49.53%

1966-01-01

7210 IBM

5.17%

33.08%

50.06%

1967-01-01

7343 EXXON MOBIL CORP

6.05%

29.58%

45.95%

1968-01-01

7348 EXXON MOBIL CORP

7.72%

32.79%

45.97%

1969-01-01

7392 SCHLUMBERGER LTD

6.43%

35.26%

48.99%

1970-01-01

7496 EXXON MOBIL CORP

6.30%

25.74%

37.71%

1971-01-01

7827 EXXON MOBIL CORP

4.87%

27.95%

38.52%

1972-01-01

8434 NEC CORP

9.79%

31.29%

41.81%

1973-01-01

8640 NEC CORP

12.23%

24.80%

34.86%

1974-01-01

8536 NEC CORP

6.91%

18.90%

27.30%

1975-01-01

9042 NEC CORP

5.24%

24.37%

31.79%

1976-01-01

9450 NEC CORP

5.10%

20.80%

27.77%

1977-01-01

10159 NEC CORP

5.38%

16.36%

25.25%

1978-01-01

10961 NEC CORP

5.18%

18.40%

28.28%

1979-01-01

11195 NEC CORP

4.67%

18.53%

27.23%

1980-01-01

11303 NEC CORP

3.91%

19.47%

30.37%

1981-01-01

11541 ALTRIA GROUP INC

2.78%

20.02%

33.32%
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1982-01-01

11769 EXXON MOBIL CORP

3.20%

20.22%

31.81%

1983-01-01

12126 EXXON MOBIL CORP

3.35%

20.55%

31.26%

1984-01-01

12759 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO

3.16%

18.37%

29.34%

1985-01-01

13362 EXXON MOBIL CORP

2.64%

17.54%

29.91%

1986-01-01

13527 COCA COLA CO

2.56%

18.12%

30.63%

1987-01-01

14076 COCA COLA CO

2.89%

19.89%

31.67%

1988-01-01

14471 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO

3.15%

18.72%

31.09%

1989-01-01

14493 MICROSOFT CORP

3.92%

22.09%

37.95%

1990-01-01

14575 MICROSOFT CORP

5.04%

23.84%

39.28%

1991-01-01

14815 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO

4.21%

19.94%

33.65%

1992-01-01

14605 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO

4.28%

21.69%

34.69%

1993-01-01

14284 MICROSOFT CORP

3.26%

19.36%

33.71%

1994-01-01

14167 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO

3.02%

18.61%

31.62%

1995-01-01

14072 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO

3.27%

17.50%

27.68%

1996-01-01

13889 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO

2.81%

15.89%

25.97%

1997-01-01

13664 EXXON MOBIL CORP

3.16%

15.03%

24.97%

1998-01-01

13330 EXXON MOBIL CORP

4.00%

16.14%

26.70%

1999-01-01

12525 EXXON MOBIL CORP

5.89%

17.40%

27.64%

2000-01-01

11640 ALTRIA GROUP INC

3.37%

16.55%

25.87%

2001-01-01

10926 APPLE INC

3.87%

17.02%

26.51%

2002-01-01

10305 APPLE INC

4.58%

18.82%

27.75%

2003-01-01

9931 APPLE INC

4.34%

16.96%

26.22%

2004-01-01

9751 APPLE INC

3.90%

16.57%

27.37%

2005-01-01

9745 APPLE INC

4.80%

16.73%

28.32%

2006-01-01

9608 APPLE INC

4.72%

18.74%

32.29%

2007-01-01

9369 APPLE INC

4.90%

19.03%

31.59%

2008-01-01

9090 APPLE INC

4.75%

20.72%

31.58%
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